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When, how, and why do policy makers and reformers use 
courts and legal procedures to achieve their policy ends?  
This project explores the relationship of courts to the 
process of policy reform in Texas.  I predict that 
reformers within this context utilize judicial and quasi-
judicial strategies in different ways than the current 
literature suggests, that is that courts and legislatures 
are used interdependently to advance a policy goal. This 
line of inquiry enhances our understanding of the 
relationship of courts to policy reform as it contemplates 
reformers utilizing court based reform strategies in ways 
other than a court ruling in their favor and producing the 
desired policy end.  This study also contemplates courts in 
the policy making arena as more than just one static 
institution; rather, court based strategies can and do 
encompass other quasi-judicial institutions available to 
 v 
reformers to advance their policy objectives.  Through an 
in-depth case study analysis of reform in the areas of the 
scope of practice battle between engineers and architects, 
transportation infrastructure funding, and voter ID, I find 
that reformers, constrained by the overall opportunity 
structures available, choose a set of strategies that 
utilize multiple venues in ways that strengthen each other, 
so that their strategies are not just alternative or 
sequential but interdependent.    
 vi 
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Politics matters.  Certainly much scholarly energy has 
focused on this simple statement in the field of public law 
since Dahl’s contention in 1957 that the Supreme Court of 
the United States is a political institution.
1
  Dahl goes on 
to assert:  
The fact is, then, that the policy views dominant on 
the Court are never for long out of line with the 
policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities 
of the United States.  Consequently it would be most 
unrealistic to suppose that the Court would, for more 
than a few years at most, stand against any major 
alternatives sought by a lawmaking majority.
2
   
 
This provocative hypothesis has certainly been the subject 
of much scholarly critique.  For the purpose of this 
project, however, it is a point of departure.  If the 
appointed Court conceived in the vein of the separation of 
powers doctrine behaves in a manner according to the 
lawmaking majority, then how might we expect an elected 
court with the same party affiliation as the lawmaking 
majority to behave?  Moreover, if politics indeed matters 
to political scientists in our quest for understanding how 
those in power make policy decisions, does it also matter 
                                                 
1 Dahl, Robert, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker,” Journal of Public Law, Vol. 6 (1957). 
2Dahl, 1957. 
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to the reformers operating within the system attempting to 
undertake policy change?   
Much of the public law literature to date has framed 
the decision of reformers to utilize a court to advance a 
policy goal as an “either/or” proposition, meaning a 
reformer will utilize either the court or the legislature 
as a venue of reform.  Assuming reformers are rational 
actors, existing theories would predict reformers’ 
decisions to be constrained by the institutional rules of 
the game and the venue influenced by where reformers 
believe they can maximize the likelihood of success.  
Theories diverge on how the likelihood of success is best 
calculated and span a structural to behavioral spectrum. 
However, current theories do not account for a multi-venue 
approach that incorporates the utilization of institutions 
in an interdependent manner, that is reformers’ decisions 
to utilize the court in a way that will stimulate 
legislative action or the legislature in a way that will 
impact court proceedings and potentially court based 
outcomes.  Rather than view the court as a standalone venue 
of reform to advance a policy goal, do reformers utilize 
judicial and quasi-judicial strategies in conjunction with 
and synergistic to legislative strategies?  Is the business 
 3 
of policy reform indeed more complex in this regard than 
current theories describe?      
While the public law literature has traditionally 
viewed reform strategy with a lens that separates 
legislative and judicial institutions, it may be that 
reformers do not necessarily disentangle the two, as 
progress in one arena could impact progress in the other 
because the institutions coexist within the same overall 
structure.  I hypothesize, therefore, that reformers 
utilize both legislative and judicial venues of reform in 
tandem to advance their specific policy goals.   
This project seeks to systematically explore the 
relationship of courts to the process of social policy 
reform in the Texas.  I predict that reformers within this 
context utilize judicial and quasi-judicial strategies in 
different ways than the current literature suggests, that 
is that courts and legislatures are used interdependently 
to advance a policy goal. By focusing on the external 
relationship of courts as institutions to other 
institutions in the political system, including interest 
groups and reformers, it is my hope that this research will 
provide a better understanding the relationship of courts 
to their larger political framework.  I am hopeful that 
this research will contribute to scholarly debate in the 
 4 
public law field and most importantly provide a deeper 
understanding of the role of courts in the complex and 





THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MULTI-VENUE STRATEGY FOR POLICY 
CHANGE 
 
When, how, and why do policy makers use courts and legal 
procedures to achieve their desired policy ends?  Because 
of the reactionary nature of courts, reformers must make 
the first move and create an opportunity for a court to 
act.  Thus, generally speaking, courts cannot simply insert 
themselves in the policy making process; courts must first 
have an invitation to the party before they can dance.  It 
follows, then, that an important component to understanding 
the when, how and why courts are utilized in policy making 
is the decision first made by the reformer to seek court 
based policy change.  The decision making process of a 
reformer to determine such avenues of reform i.e. when and 
to what extent to utilize the court system to achieve the 
desired policy goal is a central focus of this study.  
Reform, in the context of this study, refers simply to 
policy change; those pursuing the policy change, either to 
the right or to the left, are therefore labeled reformers.      
I hypothesize that varying opportunity structures 
shape reformers decisions about when, how, and why to 
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utilize a court as a means to shape/make social policy.  
Additionally, I hypothesize that reformers in the field 
utilize institutions as a means to advance their policy 
goals as part of an overall strategy to accomplish an 
objective, rather than as an ends that will deliver a 
specific outcome.  Should this hypothesis bear fruit, our 
understanding of the relationship of courts to policy 
reform will be enhanced as it contemplates reformers 
utilizing court based reform strategies in ways other than 
a court ruling in their favor and producing the desired 
policy end.  These questions also contemplate courts in the 
policy making arena as more than just one static 
institution; rather, court based strategies can and do 
encompass other quasi-judicial institutions available to 
reformers to advance their policy objectives.  
 
Multi-Venue Reform and Interdependent Strategies  
 
Building from Roch and Howard’s
3
 assertion that the lines 
between an elected court and legislature are blurred 
because of their interconnectivity to the election process, 
I argue that reformers do not distinguish between court 
                                                 
3 Roch, Christine and Robert Howard, “State Policy Innovation in 
Perspective: Courts, Legislatures, and Education Finance Reform,” 
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 61 (2008) p. 342. 
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based reform strategy and legislative reform strategy as 
separate and distinct avenues of reform.  Rather, reformers 
formulate strategies that incorporate both venues of reform 
to advance policy agendas.  By utilizing a synergistic 
approach between legislative and judicial avenues rather 
than a uni-dimensional approach, reformers are more likely 
to be successful in securing their preferred policy 
outcome.  Constrained by the overall opportunity structures 
available, reformers choose a set of strategies that 
utilize available venues in ways that strengthen each 
other, so that the strategies are not just alternative or 
sequential but interdependent.  
 
Opportunity Structures – What Venues are Available as 
Potential Avenues of Reform? 
 
The concept of “opportunity structures” influencing the 
strategy crafted by reformers to advance a policy goal is 
not new.  Literature related to broad based social 
movements utilizes this concept to identify favorable 
conditions for the birth of a social movement, likelihood 
of movement success, etc. Gloppen defines an opportunity 
structure as: 
 8 
…the set of possible avenues for remedying the 
problem… political mobilization; media pressure; 
Ombuds offices — and the courts. Choice of strategy 
depends on their relative availability, accessibility, 
cost, perceived effectiveness, and normative 
acceptability. People and organizations are assumed to 
pursue litigation when doing so is seen as the most 
promising route, given their available resources and 




According to Wilson and Cordero
5
, the notion of political 
opportunity structures is used to explain why social 
movements embrace particular strategies and that specific 
factors outline the universe of possibilities that interest 
groups can exploit when pursuing their goals.  Tarrow’s 
dynamic conception of opportunity structures provides for 
actors themselves creating and manipulating opportunities 
through creating networks, coalitions, and incentives for 
decision makers to act.
6
 
 Building upon this literature, I contend that 
opportunity structures as applied to reform strategy are 
both intuitionally and politically defined.  Institutional 
constraints with regard to opportunities to engage in a 
                                                 
4 Gloppen, Siri, “Litigation as a Strategy to Hold Governments 
Accountable for Implementing the Right to Health,” Health and Human 
Rights, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2008), p. 23. 
 
5 Wilson, Bruce and Juan Carlos Rodriguez Cordero, “Legal Opportunity 
Structures and Social Movements: The Effects of Institutional Change on 
Costa Rican Politics,” Comparative Political Studies, April 2006, p. 
326.  
6
 Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious 
Politics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge 




particular venue vary; for example, rules associated with 
approaching the legislature to address a particular policy 
may differ from rules associated with engaging judicial or 
quasi-judicial institutions.  Professionalized reformers 
are aware of the rules associated with barriers to entry 
for the menu of potential venues that the underlying 
separation of powers structure dictates.  
Opportunity structures, in the US case, are also 
influenced by federalism.  Therefore, some traditional 
areas of state policy reform may be framed in ways that 
open additional opportunities in the federal system should 
reformers assess such a maneuver to be advantageous.  The 
issue of voter ID which I examine in detail is a good 
example of such an issue as the policy change is initiated 
in the state lawmaking arena but ultimately transcends that 
arena and enters the federal court system.   
Finally, opportunity structures are also politically 
defined.  Because of the specific institutional design, one 
would predict that a legislature and an elected court that 
are dominated by the same political party would be inclined 
to advance policy, to the extent that it advanced the party 
platform, in a similar manner.  For reformers in a partisan 
minority, opportunity structures may hinge upon the 
partisan makeup of available venues and the extent to which 
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one venue is more aligned than another. However, not all 
issues that reformers seek to influence fit nicely within a 
partisan construct; consequently the extent to which 
reformers calculate the presence of political parties 
within certain venues into their strategy of reform may 
vary according to issue type.   
 Therefore, the strategy of reform is influenced by the 
opportunity structure with regard to the population of 
venues available to the reformer.  In summary, I argue that 
the choice of venue selection is a factor of 1) 
institutional constraints related to barriers to entry 
among legislative, judicial and quasi-judicial venues 2) 
jurisdictional factors within the US federal system, and 3) 
the extent to which the desired policy outcome is connected 
to the partisan makeup of a venue.  
 
Multi-Venue Reform Strategy – Engaging Venues in Reform 
 
Traditional American public law literature has framed the 
decision of reformers to utilize a court to advance a 
policy goal as an “either/or” proposition, meaning a 
reformer will utilize either the court or the legislature 
as a venue of reform.  I contend, however, that reformers 
utilize strategies that engage multiple venues rather than 
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a single strategy based on the possibilities and 
limitations that are inherent in each venue.    
 While the American public law literature has focused 
on courts as a standalone strategy of reform, the concept 
that courts can be utilized by activists as part of a 
multi-venue reform strategy is not entirely novel.  In 
their edited volume, Courting Social Justice: Judicial 
Enforcement if Social and Economic Rights in the Developing 
World, Gauri and Brinks examine how reformers engage in the 
policy legalization of social and economic rights across 
developing countries.  They describe their findings: 
What we see and what we have described as legalization 
is not so much the courts closing off debate in more 
representative venues as it is adding another venue 
for debate.  What we observe is not the courts 
substituting their own judgment for a legislative one, 
but rather injecting new concerns into a debate or 
perhaps foregrounding goals derived from 
constitutional or legislative concerns. 
7
     
 
According to Gauri and Brinks, “This account of 
legalization weakens the popular dichotomy between judicial 
and legislative action.”
8
      
 If the dichotomy between legislative and judicial 
action is indeed weakened as evidenced by the empirical 
research in Gauri and Brinks’ account, what explains why 
                                                 
7 Gauri, Varun and Daniel M. Brinks Eds., Courting Social Justice: 
Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing 
World, (New York: Cambridge University Press) 2008, p. 343. 
8 Ibid, p. 5. 
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reformers might utilize a multi-venue approach rather than 
a standalone judicial or quasi-judicial strategy?  Volumes 
of public law literature abound on the impact, or possibly 
lack thereof, of judicial decisions in public policy 
reform.  Levine and Becker
9
 suggest that the United States 
Supreme Court has a limited effect on policy impact in 
American society.  They argue three reasons for Supreme 
Court inefficiency: lower court autonomy, elite 
unresponsiveness, and public unawareness.  More 
specifically, lower courts often apply standards in 
variation with those articulated by the Supreme Court, 
because findings of fact provide flexibility, high court 
language is often easily manipulated and state courts can 
often insulate themselves by grounding their decisions in 
state law.  Elites often do not voluntarily comply with 
court proclamations, because of bureaucratic inertia or 
even simple ignorance of the changes called for by judicial 
decisions, and the judiciary generally lacks the ability to 
sanction elites in order to coerce compliance.  
Furthermore, according to Levine and Becker, the public 
tends not to realize what is going on with the Court.  
                                                 
9 Levine, James and Theodore Becker, “Toward and Beyond a Theory of 
Supreme Court Impact,” in Becker, Theodore Lewis and Malcom Feeley eds. 
The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions; Empirical Studies, (New York: 
Oxford University Press) 1973. 
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Levine and Becker also note that empirical evidence of 
symbolic effects of decisions is fairly meager, a concern 
shared by Wasby as well in his work, The Impact of the 
United State Supreme Court.
10
  Johnson and Canon
11
 inventory 
theories put forth put to explain and examine judicial 
impact which include psychological theories, such as 
legitimacy theory, which implies the more legitimate the 
Court and its decisions are seen to be the greater the 
impact, utility theory, essentially cost-benefit analysis 
guiding responsiveness to judicial decisions, 
communications theory, where proper context and packaging 
of decisions can increase impact, and organizational 
theories, which discuss how decisions are often implemented 
by agencies whose organizational policies and procedures 
may in turn effect policy implementation.   
 Additionally, Rosenberg’s empirical analysis in The 
Hollow Hope provides a compelling argument that the courts, 
and in particular the Supreme Court, in fact have little 
effect on social policy.  Specifically concerning Brown v 
Board of Education, Rosenberg provides a detailed analysis 
of Court action in the context of legislative and executive 
                                                 
10 Wasby, Stephen, The Impact of the United States Supreme Court The 
Impact of the United States Supreme Court: Some Perspectives (Dorsey, 
1970).  
11 Johnson, Charles and Bradley Canon, Judicial Policies: Implementation 
and Impact. (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press) 1984. 
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action and policy implementation.  The evidence surrounding 
the implementation of desegregation practices supports the 
Constrained Court view that the Court is unable to exhibit 
any real policy influence because of three separate 
constraints built into the structure of the judicial 
system: the limited nature of constitutional rights, the 
lack of judicial independence, and the courts’ lack of 
implementation powers.   
Rosenberg’s examination of the United States Supreme 
Court with regard to impact on social policy reform 
portrays courts as a rather ineffective mechanism for 
change largely due to formal institutional constraints.  
Furthermore, Gauri and Brinks engage in impact based 
arguments that tackle questions regarding when courts are 
able to advance social and economic rights in a comparative 
context.  For Gauri and Brinks, “Courts have their greatest 
impact when policy seems unresponsive to popular demands.”
12
  
Thus, my contention that reformers utilize strategies that 
engage multiple venues is informed by the public law 
literature that argues that the courts do not produce great 
results when utilized as a standalone strategy.  It 
follows, then, that reformers seeking a desired policy 
change would adopt strategies that maximize the likelihood 
                                                 
12 Ibid, p. 6. 
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of a successful policy implementation.  As political 
scientists, we should expect reformers to be able to assess 
the benefits and limitations of individual venues and craft 




Finally, I contend that reformers utilize a multi-venue 
approach in an interdependent manner, that is incremental 
movement in one venue is purposefully meant to create 
action in another venue. What might this type of reform 
strategy look like?  If a reform strategy does entail a 
multi-venue approach, then we must re-examine how we define 
the goals and objectives of the utilization of each venue.  
Rather than choose a venue of reform based on perceived 
maximization of the likelihood of success as a pure 
rational choice framework would predict, or as a last 
resort strategy as literature related to litigation 
strategy would predict, venues may be utilized to achieve 
smaller objectives on the path to the desired end.  To 
restate, a multi-venue approach logically entails various 
desired outcomes other than simply achieving the end policy 
objective.  Reformers may utilize judicial and quasi-
judicial approaches not because they think the issue 
 16 
ultimately will be resolved in that particular venue but 
perhaps to stimulate legislative action that will 
ultimately move the reform to its desired end.  Or they may 
adapt their strategies as the progress back and forth 
between venues – a small victory or even defeat in one 
venue can be utilized to progress in another.  In this 
sense, a multi-venue approach to policy reform would view 
legislative and quasi-judicial or judicial activity as 
interdependent, meaning that the processes and outcomes of 
one venue can be utilized in another.   The following 
classifications are offered to summarize potential feedback 
effects of such a strategy.      
 
Potential Interdependent Strategies: 
 
There are four main feedback strategies that reformers 
might employ when utilizing legislative and judicial or 
quasi-judicial strategies interdependently, but these 
strategies must first be oriented within the reform 
context.  Predominant arguments within the interest 
mobilization literature as well as initial research suggest 
that reformers perceive that a legislative strategy 
provides the reformer with more control over the policy 
outcome versus a court based strategy in which a judge 
 17 
provides a decision or ruling dictating a particular 
outcome.  Thus, legislative based reform is perceived to be 
the preferred method of obtaining policy change by 
reformers.  Additionally, the barriers to entry for a 
legislative strategy are perceived to be quite low while 
the barriers to entry for a court based strategy are 
perceived to be higher.  Institutional constraints would 
therefore suggest that reformers utilize courts or quasi-
judicial venues as last resort strategies.  But, my 
contention is that reformers actually utilize a multi-venue 
approach which would suggest that while last resort 
strategies may in fact take place, additional motivations 
also exist for engaging the court system in policy reform.   
Reformers will also utilize the court and quasi-judicial 
venues in conjunction with a legislative strategy to create 
a legislative environment that maximizes their likelihood 
of success.  The four classifications of these feedback 
strategies that I have identified are agenda setting, 
reframing, venue of last resort, and abstaining.  
 
Agenda Setting  
In a multi-venue approach, reformers may utilize court and 
quasi-judicial strategies to engage in legislative agenda 
setting through court action/inaction.  For example, the 
 18 
issuance of an AG opinion might be utilized by reformers to 
stimulate legislative interest in a particular policy area.  
Additionally, while the policy issue is moving through the 
court system, reformers may generate legislative interest 
in providing clarifying legislation that would affect the 
outcome of a court ruling.  In this strategy, reformers do 
not pursue court and quasi-judicial venues to achieve their 
desired outcome, rather, to move forward in achieving their 
desired legislative outcome. Peters describes how agenda 
setting previously has been characterized in political 
science literature: 
Many who have studied the agenda-setting process of 
the legislative and executive branches have focused on 
the role of attentive interest groups or other kinds 
of policy activists in mobilizing to attract 
government's attention (see, e.g., Baumgartner  and 
Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder 1983; Cobb, Ross, and Ross 
1976; Kingdon 1984; Light 1982; Walker 1977). The 
question, then, is how issue communities participate 
and how important their participation is. Does the 
Court, through its decisions, "focus the attention of 
litigants on particular policy areas, thereby 
increasing its ability to make comprehensive policy in 
those areas in the future" (Baird 2004, 769)? Or is 
the process more akin to one described by public 
policy scholars where, as Epp (1998, 1999) envisioned, 
members of issue communities are necessary players 





                                                 
13 Peters, C. Scott, “Getting Attention: The Effect of Legal 
Mobilization on the U.S. Supreme Court's Attention to Issues,” 
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 561-572. 
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For the purposes of this project, agenda setting from the 
reformer’s point of view is more concerned with reform 
strategy rather than court behavior.  However, Peters does 
not contemplate the extent to which reform strategy can 
utilize activity in one branch to influence the agenda of 
another as does the multi-venue approach presented here.       
 
Reframe Issue  
Reformers may engage in a reframing strategy when they 
utilize the courts and quasi-judicial institutions and 
legislature in an interdependent manner in their efforts to 
change policy.   Court and/or quasi-judicial involvement 
interjected into the issue can be used to isolate or 
highlight a particular part of an issue or simply to 
bolster the argument that the statute is not clear and 
requires legislative attention.  As in agenda setting, 
reformers may not be pursuing court based strategies as 
their end game but in an effort to stimulate legislative 
action.  Additionally, adaptive reformers may utilize 
particular negative outcomes of a court based strategy to 
reframe their issue in a different venue.  For example, if 
the utilization of a venue such as an administrative court 
did not produce a desired result, that negative outcome 
could be used to argue for legislative action.  
 20 
Furthermore, the interdependent nature of multi-venue 
reform is not one directional in that court based 
strategies are utilized to effect legislative outcomes.  
Rather, legislative process and procedures can also be used 
by reformers to reframe an issue in the judicial arena.  
For example, witness testimony and bill analyses can be 
strategically crafted to influence future judicial activity 
on the issue.       
 
Venue of Last Resort   
A multi-venue approach does not preclude the possibility of 
reformers using a court or quasi-judicial venue as a last 
resort strategy in the manner in which litigant strategy 
literature suggests.  In a last resort strategy, attempts 
of reform have failed in the legislative arena.  In this 
scenario, reformers are seeking policy reform/resolution of 
the issue through court action.  I am therefore in 
agreement that reformers can and do utilize the court in 
ways that the current litigant strategy suggests, but that 
it is actually one of several strategies nestled into a 




Conversely, reformers may choose not to engage in a court 
based strategy.  In addition to refraining from court 
action out of fear of a negative outcome, reformers may 
also decide not to pursue court action when the negative 
political costs of a positive ruling outweigh the positive 
effects of the ruling itself.  In this scenario, a court 
based venue may be available and the perception of success 
in that arena may be high, but because reformers operate in 
a political context rather than a vacuum, reformers may 
decide that the political costs of success in that arena 
are too high.  In addition, reformers may choose not to 
engage in a court strategy because of the perceived loss of 
control over the policy outcome.  If the desired policy 
outcome is complex rather than a simple “yes” or “no,” 
reformers may shy away from a court based outcome even if 
they evaluate the overall environment to be favorable.  The 
overall point is to recognize that the decision not to 
utilize a particular venue may be just as strategic as the 
decision to utilize that venue.  We cannot assume that the 
absence of action means that the activity was not 
considered by reformers.        
 
This theoretical framework of multi-venue reform is meant 
to enhance the understanding of the strategic 
 22 
interdependence of venues that reformers utilize when 
engaging in policy reform.  Should the examination of a 
multi-venue approach to policy reform bear fruit, then our 
understanding of the relationship between court action and 
policy making becomes more complex.  The utilization of 
courts by reformers may be at times less about a particular 
court decision meant to “decide” an issue and more about 
the interaction and interdependence of legislative and 




INTEREST MOBILIZATION AND LITIGAION STRATEGY  
 
If we are to examine the decisions of reformers as a unit 
of analysis, we must first delve into literature related to 
reformers themselves.   Because reformers have more than 
one option (the courts) at their disposal for achieving a 
desired policy outcome, it is necessary to broaden our 
discussion of literature to include both interest 
mobilization and litigation strategy. Scholarship related 
to interest mobilization and litigation strategy will thus 
be our starting point. 
 
Legislative Strategy – The Conventional Paradigm 
 
Conventional wisdom suggests that interest mobilization in 
the United States is most often associated with the 
legislative branch of government.  One need not go beyond 
the curriculum in most high school government classes or 
the dictionary’s definition of lobbying to find this 
emphasis: “to conduct activities aimed at influencing 




 Much scholarly research has been 
done in the legislative lobbying arena as to how and when 
reformers attempt to influence policy decisions within the 
legislative process.  While a detailed history of this body 
of political science literature is beyond the scope of this 
project, it is important to note that the primary focus has 
been on the legislature as a standalone entity.  David 
Lowery succinctly summarizes the nature and critiques of 
this research:  
Choices about what issues to lobby and what tactics to 
employ, as well as the likelihood of their success, 
depend on institutions that allow or impede access, 
the public opinion context in which debates take 
place, and which other organized interests are also 
lobbying the issue. Again, this may seem very obvious. 
But such attention to context was, in fact, quite 
uncommon until recently. As Baumgartner and Leech 
noted from their survey of articles in the American 
Political Science Review, "the modal type of interest 
group study in the premier journal of political 
science over the postwar period is a cross-sectional 
comparison of a few groups working on a single issue 
at one point in time. Such a research approach seems a 
perfect strategy for producing unexplained variation 
between studies. It is a recipe," they further note, 
"for the creation of a contradictory and noncumulative 
literature."
15
 In other words, the research designs of 
many studies of the politics of interest 
                                                 
14 Merriam-Webster.com, accessed 10/2/2012. 
15
 Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, "Interest Niches and Policy 
Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National 
Politics," Journal of Politics 63 (2001): 1191–1213 as quoted in 
Lowery, David. “Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-









While Lowery as well as Baumgartner and Leach identify the 
importance of context to the understanding of interest 
mobilization in the legislative arena, neither contemplates 
the importance of context as it relates to potential 
judicial alternatives for reformers.  Lowery goes on to 
state:     
 
…institutions matter. Perhaps most importantly, the 
venue in which lobbying takes place matters a great 
deal, as illustrated by the tremendous success of the 
religious right in the United States in lobbying via 
electoral campaigns, but its relative failure to turn 
that success into legislation. In the former venue, 
the drag of the general unpopularity of the policy 
agenda of the religious right could be avoided by 





Interestingly, in his contention that institutions matter, 
Lowery acknowledges the potential relationship between the 
electoral process and the legislature as separate but 
interconnected venues of influence for reformers seeking 
policy reform.   
                                                 
16
 Lowery, David “Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-
Context Theory of Lobbying,” Polity, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Jan., 2007), pp. 
29-54. 
 
17 Lowery, 2007. 
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I acknowledge that a vast and detailed literature on 
the practice and process of lobbying is indeed well known 
within the discipline, but what seems to be notably absent 
is the inclusion of courts. In addition to contributing to 
public law discourse, this project seeks to add to 
scholarly discussion  on lobbying by including potential 
judicial and quasi-judicial avenues of reform that are 
available as potential influencers of policy outcomes.   
 
 
Litigation Strategy – When to Go to Court versus the 
Legislature 
 
Literature related to litigation strategy is often a point 
of departure for scholars interested in when, how, and why 
reformers utilize courts.  Scholars such as Jacobi describe 
potential explanations in economic terms, “…is that the 
extent to which economic agencies can turn to the courts 
for solutions, when legislative solutions are not 
forthcoming, will be conditional on wealth, since 
litigation is costly.”
18
 The law and economics literature as 
described by Farhang further develops this line of inquiry 
                                                 
18 Jacobi, Tonja, “The Role of Politics and Economics in Explaining 
Variation in Litigation Rates in the U.S. States,” The Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 2009), pp. 205-233. 
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through the model of rational litigant behavior which 
contemplates that a plaintiff will proceed with litigation 
when the expected monetary benefits of winning at trial 
outweigh the probability and cost of losing at trial.
19
  
While this body of literature adds to our understanding of 
motivating factors for litigants, it does not provide for 
judicial outcomes other than the desired determinative 
outcome.  The utilization of judicial venues in policy 
reform is perhaps more broadly conceived by reformers.    
Other more institutionalist based literature suggests 
that the configuration of institutions and resulting 
opportunity structures influence litigant strategy.   
Hanssen examines the institutional element of judicial 
selection as it relates to litigant strategy and finds that 
that appointed state court systems experience higher 
litigation rates consistent with his hypothesis that the 
“independence” achieved through the appointment process has 
a net positive effect on decision uncertainty.
20
   Alter and 
Vargas argue that litigation is generally a last choice 
strategy because courts (appointed) are generally a less 
                                                 
19 Farhang, Sean, “Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American 
Separation of Powers System,” American Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. 52, No. 4 (Oct., 2008), pp. 821-839. 
 
 
20 Hanssen, F. Andrew, “The Effect of Judicial Institutions on 
Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment 
of State Judges,” The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 28 (January 1999) 
p. 205. 
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predictable venue and better at removing objectionable 
legislation rather than creating favorable policy.
21
  
According to Cross, Andrew Whitford’s study on 
environmental litigation shows “how an interest group can 
form a stable coalition and use the courts at a time when 
the other branches of government are unsympathetic to that 
group’s objectives,”
22
 also insinuating the court is the 
option of “last-resort” for reformers.   Songer, Cameron, 
and Segal empirically verify that litigants behave in a 
rational manner,
23
 so the emphasis on predictability could 
indeed be a significant factor on litigant strategy; yet 
the factors that the litigant considers when evaluating 
potential actions regarding legislative versus judicial 
avenues of reform under an elected judicial system remains 
largely unexamined.    
Other arguments regarding the utilization of courts by 
reformers in social policy making include Rosenberg (1991) 
who argues that courts will be successful in this endeavor 
only if his constraints are overcome and conditions met.  
His largely institutional analysis does not take into 
                                                 
21 Alter, Karen and Jeannette Vargas, “Explaining Variation in the Use 
of European Litigation Strategies: European Community Law and British 
Gender Equality Policy,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol 33, Number  
4 (2000) p. 472. 
22 Cross, Frank, “Business and Judicial Politics,” Business and 
Politics: Vol.5 (2003), p. 4. 
23 Songer, Donald, Charles Cameron, and Jeffrey Segal, “An Empirical 
Test of the Rational-Actor Theory of Litigation,” Journal of Politics, 
Vol 57 (1995). 
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account the intricacies of elected judges which this study 
incorporates or the extent that changes in party politics 
may affect reformers’ decisions to take their battles to 
court.  Epp (1998) argues that courts succeed in this 
regard only when there is a "support structure" for legal 
mobilization consisting of organizations dedicated to 
establishing rights, committed and able lawyers, and 
sources of financing.
24
  However, like Rosenberg, Epp is 
focused on the impact of court decisions rather than on 
reformers’ decisions to utilize courts to advance social 
policy reform.  With regard to litigation strategy, Blom et 
al. (1995) argue that the more narrow the interest group’s 
constituency, the more likely a group will turn to a 
court;
25
 this may be evident in the federal context, however 
in the state context (Texas), not only do well-known broad 
based coalitions such as education groups utilize the court 
to advance policy change, but narrow constituencies also 
frequently utilize legislative-based reform strategies. 
Giles and Lancaster (1989) argue that democratic political 
contexts contribute to the use of courts, but do not 
                                                 
24 Epp, Charles R.  The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and 
Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press) 1998. 
25 Blom, J. Fitzpatrick, B. Gregory, J., Knegt, R., and O’Hare, U. 
(1995). The Utilization of Sex Equality Litigation Procedures in the 
Member States of The European Community, A Comparative Study. As 
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discuss variation in court usage within an “established” 
democratic context.
26
   
Meyer and Boutcher attempt to answer their research 
question: “Given the difficulties of winning broad social 
change in the courts, why do activists continue to pursue 
litigation oriented strategies?” Their study examines 
social movements in the United States context in light of 
Brown v Board of Education.
27
  They argue: 
Persistence in the face of an unfavorable environment 
is a function of ideological enticements, 
organizational interests, specialized expertise, and 
policy threats.  First, activists are lured to the 
courts by what Stuart Scheingold called the "myth of 
rights."  More than three decades ago, Scheingold  
warned that this myth, and the concomitant faith that 
the legal system, if properly challenged, could 
promote sweeping social change, was misdirecting  
activist attentions.  Still, the popular understanding 
of Brown sustains activist faith in the same way that 
stories of lottery winners lead others to buy lottery 




For Meyer and Boutcher, the post-Brown context is one in 
which activists’ idealism about the legal systems ability 
to create sweeping social change influences the decision to 
litigate.  They go on to include necessity for 
organizational survival (i.e. interest or activist group) 
                                                 
26 Giles, Michael W. and Thomas D. Lancaster. “Political Transition, 
Social Development, and Legal Mobilization in Spain,” American 
Political Science Review. 1989 83 (3): 817-833.  
27 Meyer, David S and  Steven A. Boutcher, “Signals and Spillover: Brown 
V. Board of Education and Other Social Movements,”Perspectives on 
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as well as the skill sets of those employed by interest 
groups as influencers of litigation strategy.  They argue:      
Continued litigation fills a distinct organizational 
niche within a social movement, and makes use of well-
established organizational expertise; even in the 





Thus, for Meyer and Boutcher, the desire for self-
preservation among the professional activists involved in 
reform movements influences the decision to litigate on 
behalf of a larger group. 
 Similar to this study, Meyer and Boucher are 
interested in why reformers utilize courts in social policy 
reform.  As mentioned above, they offer several factors 
that they argue influence reformers decisions to litigate, 
but their factors (the rights myth, self-preservation, 
etc.) are primarily focused on the attitudes of the 
reformer as an individual rather than the strategy a 
reformer uses to accomplish an objective.  While it is 
possible a reformer may view the court system as a defender 
of rights and therefore a sexy venue to fight on behalf of 
a particular interest, this conception of reformers does 
not shed light on their strategic decision making or the 
processes utilized to ultimately accomplish an objective.  
In fact, Scheingold’s lottery parallel as described by 
                                                 
29 Meyer and Boutcher, 2007. 
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Meyer and Boutcher implies the absence of such strategic 
behavior.      
It is clear from our survey that much scholarship has 
been produced in the areas of interest mobilization and 
litigant strategy, but the central questions of this study, 
where these bodies of literature intersect, have not been 
fully addressed.  The strategic behavior of reformers in 
utilizing legislative versus judicial venues, utilizing 
venues in tandem, and utilizing judicial venues other than 
just courts to achieve policy reform remains largely 







INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF COURTS 
 
The primary objective of this study is to examine when, 
how, and why reformers utilize judicial institutions when 
engaging in policy reform.  To restate, I argue that 
reformers do not distinguish between court based reform 
strategy and legislative reform strategy as separate and 
distinct avenues of reform.  Rather, reformers formulate 
strategies that incorporate both venues of reform to 
advance policy agendas.  By utilizing a synergistic 
approach between legislative and judicial avenues rather 
than a uni-dimensional approach, reformers are more likely 
to be successful in securing their preferred policy 
outcome.  Constrained by the overall opportunity structures 
available, reformers choose a set of strategies that 
utilize available venues in ways that strengthen each 
other, so that the strategies are not just alternative or 
sequential but interdependent.  
With regard to opportunity structures, I contend that 
institutional and political constraints influence how 
reformers assess venues of reform.  A brief discussion of 
the literature related to institutional design and 
 34 
political context and their effects on courts is therefore 
helpful in informing our discussion.     
 
Institutional Design – US State Courts 
 
As previously mentioned, over the last fifty years the 
American public law literature has been generally concerned 
with the federal court system. However, this project seeks 
to explore the above stated research questions within the 
context of the state of Texas.  How does existing 
literature inform our discussion? 
There has been a recent emergence of scholarship 
focusing on state judiciaries and state institutional 
configurations.  Levinson noted the importance of this line 
of inquiry in his recent book:    
One might easily explain this disregard of state 
constitutions is state governments dealt with mere 
trivialities of no interest to ordinary people…Daniel 
Rodriguez has noted that the basic range of policies 
and policy choices made by state and local officials 
dwarf – indeed always have dwarfed national political 
activity…There can be no doubt that many issues of 
great public importance are decided – or, not 
adequately confronted – within the states.
30
   
 
With regard to policy change, I suspect if one were to 
total the combined introduced legislation across state 
                                                 
30 Levinson, Sanford, Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis 
of Governance, Oxford University Press (2012), p. 29. 
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legislatures in a given legislative cycle along with state 
court activity, the sheer volume of attempted policy change 
would be enormous, as would the number of reformers 
participating in a policy change strategy.  Certainly the 
state context is a rich laboratory for scholars interested 
in this type of behavior.      
Nonetheless, theoretical formulation and inquiry 
related to the strategy of policy reform in the state 
context has been largely overlooked.  Because our federal 
system provides for robust state policy making across a 
wide variety of issue types as Levinson suggests, examining 
reform strategy in the state context is likely fruitful 
ground for our study.  The Texas case has been selected to 
explore the research questions in this project because of 
the unique access to data in this context.         
Because of the primary focus on the federal court 
system in the public law literature, much theoretical 
formulation has developed around the particulars of that 
institutional configuration with regard to judicial 
selection.  Judicial independence, the idea that appointed 
judges act independently, or at least are able to act 
independently from their political context to some extent, 
because they are appointed as opposed to elected, has been 
a central theme in the literature.  Because this project 
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focuses on courts and policy reform in the Texas case, and 
Texas judges are elected through partisan popular elections 
rather than appointed, it is important to note a 
significant difference in institutional design from that of 
the vast majority of the literature.  While partisan 
elected judges are not the unit of analysis for this study, 
we have previously examined literature regarding the 
importance of political context to court behavior and have 
posed questions as to how this context influences the 
strategic decision making of reformers.  Therefore when 
examining the Texas case, I want to first briefly 
acknowledge literature regarding this specific 
institutional design and then discuss the institutional 
options available to reformers within this context.    
 
Institutional Design and Elected Judges 
 
According to Diamond’s definition of liberal democracy, 
“individual and group liberties are protected by an 
independent, nondiscriminatory judiciary, whose decisions 
are enforced and respected by other centers of power.”
31
  
While the United States is almost always considered to be a 
                                                 
31 Diamond, Larry, Developing Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 
1999) 12. 
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liberal democracy by most scholars (and certainly the 
public), the extent to which courts, particularly at the 
state level, fit within this definition is not as clear.    
Much of the literature on the institutional design of 
courts is focused on the normative notion of an independent 
court.  This independence is typically rooted in an 
institutional design defined by appointed judges and 
achieved through a balance of the separation of powers of 
the branches of government and democratic accountability.  
Perhaps the first major proponent of an independent 
judiciary is the French philosopher Baron de Montesquieu.  
In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu writes:  
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not 
separated from the legislative and the executive.  Were it 
joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the 
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the 
judge would be then the legislator.  Were it joined to the 





As part of his philosophy on the merits of the separation 
of powers within a central government, he asserts the 
necessity of an independent judiciary to political liberty.  
In Federalist 78, Montisquieu’s influence on Hamilton is 
evident, “…that as liberty would have nothing to fear from 
the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from 
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its union with either of the other departments.”
33
  
Hamilton’s contribution to this dialogue is the 
introduction of life terms for judges, a concept delineated 
in the constitution that Hamilton supports.  “Permanency in 
office…is an indispensable ingredient…to a limited 
constitution.”
34
  In this context, Hamilton is 
operationalizing the normative value of Montesquieu’s 
independent judiciary.  In response to the permanent 
appointment of justices, a lone voice of dissent emerges 
from Brutus, writing as an Anti-Federalist.  For Brutus, an 
independent judiciary is a direct threat to democracy in 
that “there is no power above them that can control their 
decisions or correct their errors,” which will ultimately 
“enable them (judiciary) to mould the government into 
almost any shape they please.”
35
   
 It is clear that the institutional design of judicial 
appointment was intentional on the part of the “founding 
fathers” and that their desired outcome of this design is a 
court insulated from political contexts.  However, whether 
or not that outcome can be empirically verified is 
questionable.     
                                                 
33 Hamilton, Alexander, “Federalist 78,” The Federalist Papers, ed. 
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35 Brutus, Essays XI and XII, The Anti-Federalist, ed. Herbert Storing 
(Chicago: Chicago UP, 1985). 
 39 
In “The Supreme Court and Critical Elections,” Richard 
Funston builds upon what he coins as the Dahl-Dooley 
hypothesis, that “the Supreme Court follows election 
returns.”
36
  He specifically tests the hypothesis that “over 
long periods of time, the Supreme Court reflects the will 
of the dominant political forces; however, during 
transitional periods…the Court will be more likely to 
perform the counter-majoritarian functions ascribed to it 
by traditional theory.”
37
  He finds that in fact the Court 
is normally in line with the law-making majority, and then 
ponders the Court’s relevance and distinctive purpose in 
light of this research.  He concludes that the “Court, by 
virtue of its institutional position, is able to deal with 
matters of principle, whereas Congress and the president, 
because they are responsible to the electoral whims of the 
moment cannot.”
38
  It is therefore the institutional 
characteristics of the Court rather than the actions of the 
Court that define its relevance.  Extrapolating from 
Funston’s assertion, the relevance of an elected judiciary 
becomes an interesting question for further study.    
Roch and Howard consider the impact of political 
context on the decisions of elected courts and assert that 
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37 Ibid. p. 796. 
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“Legislatures and courts are different and react to 
different state factors, although the more a court’s 
institutional court structure resembles the structure of a 
legislature – that is, if the court is elected – the less 
clear are the distinctions between them.”
39
  For Roch and 
Howard, institutional design matters.  They survey 
additional scholarly research that argues that elected 
judges often respond to the demands of the electorate and 
that judicial selection elections can be as contentious as 
legislative elections.
40
  Appointed judges, on the other 
hand, are more independent of the electorate and therefore 
less likely to be responsive to voter preferences.     
Huber and Gordon examine the effect of elections on 
judges’ “impartiality.” They summarize that the “near 
consensus among legal scholars is that this tradition – 
particularly in the form of partisan, competitive contests 
– is politically unassailable but insidious in its 
potential for compromising judicial independence.”
41
  They 
continue to summarize concerns with voter based judicial 
selection that are rooted in the premise elected judges may 
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base their decisions on political demands and/or  their 
desire to be re-elected rather than legal tenets or an 
unbiased reading of the facts of the case.
42
  Through the 
statistical analysis of sentencing data of trail judges, 
they find that elected judges in Pennsylvania alter their 
behavior because of the threat (albeit weak) of losing 
their office.
43
    
Melinda Gann Hall characterizes judicial selection for 
the state court bench as “one of the most enduring issues 
on the American political agenda.”
44
  She goes on to state, 
“Almost universally, this discussion is framed as a 
conflict over the goals of electoral accountability and 
judicial independence.”
45
  Her study focuses on three types 
of election systems for judicial selection: partisan, 
nonpartisan, and retention.  She finds that those 
interested in judicial selection reform generally 
underestimate “the extent to which partisan elections have 
a tangible substantive component” and calls for a 
reassessment of the premises that opponents of partisan 
judicial selection promulgate based on scientific inquiry.
46
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 Hall continues this discussion in her recent book with 
Chris Bonneau, “In Defense of Judicial Elections.”  Through 
the examination of state supreme court elections from 1990 
to 2004, they argue:   
…that, contrary to the claims of judges, professional 
legal organizations, interest groups, and legal 
scholars, judicial elections are democracy-enhancing 
institutions that operate efficaciously and serve to 





Again, as in Gann Hall’s previously discussed work, Gann 
Hall and Bonneau tackle the normative claims surrounding 
elected judiciaries through empirical election research 
rather than reformers utilization of an elected judiciary 
to advance policy change.   
Specifically related to institutional design within 
the state context and its potential impact on litigation 
rates is Yates, Tankersley, and Brace’s work in which they 
“explore the role that state legal institutions play in 
explaining variation in legal mobilization.”
48
 In their 
recent study, they focus on two structural aspects of state 
legal institutions:   
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First, following a well-developed hypothesis in the 
literature, we posit that states' methods of selecting 
judges influence the degree to which citizens are 
disposed to using courts for the resolution of 
problems and grievances.  Second, we argue that the 
degree to which a state's court system is 
professionalized may either impede or promote citizen 
legal mobilization. Finally, we posit that the effects 
of  these institutional structural characteristics  do  
not  work independently but  are conditioned  on  the 




While Yates, Tankersley and Bruce set out to examine the 
impact that institutional design, specifically judicial 
selection, has on legal mobilization at the state level and 
note the importance of political context, they do not 
explore judicial institutions beyond courts nor do they 
frame their research in terms of an overall reform 
strategy.    
 
It is therefore evident that much has been made in the 
literature regarding the significance of judicial 
selection, and that once the institutional design of 
judicial selection changes from appointed to elected 
judges, we can reasonably predict that judicial behavior 
will be responsive to the electorate, that is, if it was 
not already as Dahl contends.  But what are the 
consequences of institutional design intentionally and 
unabashedly emphasizing judicial response to the electorate 
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and to what extent do reformers operating within such a 
context strategically utilize this supposed responsiveness? 
 
Political Context and the Court    
 
In addition to institutional constraints, I argue that 
political context impacts the opportunity structure that 
reformers evaluate when seeking venues of reform.  Because 
policy reform is inherently political, reformers do not 
engage in reform activities or craft reform strategies 
without acknowledgement or even utilization of their 
political context.  While the extent to which political 
context affects reform strategy may vary according to 
political salience of reform issues, understanding 
scholarship that speaks to the relationship of political 
context to court behavior is necessary to analyzing the 
questions that this project seeks to answer.   
Numerous scholars have suggested that the political 
environment in which a particular court is situated effects 
how the court will behave.  Michael McCann discusses in 
great detail the “strategic interaction approach” which 
emphasizes the strategic interaction of courts with other 
political actors in “How the Supreme Court Matters in 
American Politics.”  He argues that where the dominant 
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lawmaking coalitions are either unwilling or unable to act 
in a decisive manner, the Court many enter into 
policymaking as an independent actor.
50
 The important 
contribution of this approach is the acknowledgement that 
court action is part of a larger political environment in 
which “interaction among political agents is considered to 
be “strategic” to the extent that it is consciously 
deliberative, oriented toward instrumental “effectiveness” 
in advancing particular goals, and hence loosely understood 
as rational.”
51
  Giles and Lancaster argue that the 
willingness to use the courts will directly reflect the 
political context in which they are embedded.
52
 Results of 
their study on Spain show support for a relationship 
between social development and increased use of courts in a 
democratizing society.    
If court action is oriented within a particular 
political environment, then how does the makeup of that 
environment shape the court’s behavior?  In Judicial Review 
in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases, 
Ginsburg argues that the more diffuse the political 
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environment, the more courts have access to political space 
allowing for the exercise judicial review.
53
  In his 
quantitative analysis of Asian countries, Ginsburg 
demonstrates a correlation between active judicial review 
and diffused politics; conversely, in dominant political 
party environments, judicial review is more constrained.   
Furthermore, in “The Construction of the Rule of Law in 
Argentina,” Rebecca Bill Chavez argues that in an 
environment with political competition, the executive is 
unable to strip away the constitutional protections of the 
court because of pressure from the other powerful parties.  
If the system is competitive, it is unlikely that one party 
will be dominant over time, therefore divided government 
will exist, and “divided government makes it difficult for 
an executive to weaken the judiciary.”
54
  On the other hand, 
without significant party competition, the party in power 
will go unchecked in the executive and legislative 
branches, thus leaving the judiciary as the only remaining 
check on power and making it a target of the other 
branches.  Unified government therefore permits the 
manipulation of institutional design.  In conclusion, 
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Chavez encourages further sub-national study in order to 
understand the conditions that foster the 
institutionalization of the rule of law. 
 Both Ginsburg and Chavez explore political conditions, 
specifically party competition, that foster judicial 
independence which they loosely define as the willingness 
of a judiciary to rule against the executive and/or 
legislature (the courts versus other branches of 
government).  With regard to social policy reform (citizens 
(reformers) versus the government in general), might levels 
of party competition or the political salience of the issue 
in question affect how a court is utilized and its 
efficaciousness?  If politics matter according to Ginsburg 
and Chavez for judicial independence then does it also 
matter in social policy making and in what ways? 
 The literature we have examined focuses on judicial 
capacity to engage in social policy making, the resulting 
impact on policy reform, and the relevance of political 
context to court behavior.  However, the vast majority of 
these lines of scholarly inquiry have been focused 
institutional characteristics of courts, specifically 
appointed judges.  Yet reformers must operate in the 
institutional structure where the desired policy change is 
located.  Rather than focus on the institutional 
 48 
characteristics across courts, reformers must act 
strategically given both the political and institutional 
context.  Therefore, political context as defined by 
reformers in the field may differ from the understanding in 
the political science literature.  Moreover, this 
literature treats court based reform as generally a 
homogenous venue with the desired reform outcome of a 
specific policy change.  Therefore, this discussion may not 
fully take in to account variations in court based reform 
strategy that could shed light on our understanding of how 
reformers utilize courts and court based venues to achieve 








THE TEXAS CASE 
 
This project seeks to systematically explore the 
relationship of courts to the process of social policy 
reform in the Texas.  I predict that reformers within this 
context utilize judicial and quasi-judicial strategies in 
different ways than the current literature suggests, that 
is that courts and legislatures are used interdependently 
to advance a policy goal.  Because of the stated 
significance of institutional constraints informing 
reformer venue selection, a brief description of the Texas 
institutional context is necessary.    
 
Institutional Design – Elected Courts in Texas 
As previously mentioned, the Texas judicial system is 
constructed by partisan judicial selection.  In 1876, the 
Texas constitution was amended to create the popular 
election system that remains in place today, a partisan 
primary election for nomination and general election for 
affirmation.  Judicial elections are held at the same time 
and in the same manner as other partisan elected offices in 
the state.  According to Sheldon and Maule, “After 
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Reconstruction, Texas began a “long, detailed, and 
exhaustive program that was nothing short of a rebellion 
against government itself” to wipe the slate clean of 
carpetbagger judges and the restrictions of Reconstruction 
constitutions.”
55
  They go on to quote historian and former 
head of the Texas Historical Commission T.R. Fehrenbach, 
“Judgeships…were made elective, including the bench of the 
supreme court.  No judge who had to run for reelection 
regularly was expected to decide cases against the popular 
feeling, on some new fangled point of law.”
56
  The 
institutional design is intentional; populism creates 
accountability.  However, it should also be noted that 
judges in Texas are required to adhere to the Code of 
Judicial Conduct in which Canon 5 titled “Judges Should 
Refrain from Inappropriate Political Activity” specifically 
includes:  
 
A judge or judicial candidate shall not…  make pledges or 
promises of conduct in office regarding pending or 
impending cases, specific classes of cases, specific 
classes of litigants, or specific propositions of law 
that would suggest to a reasonable person that the judge 
is predisposed to a probable decision in cases within the 
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Certainly much ado has been made about the plausibility of 
balancing the necessity of financing one’s campaign though 
interest group contributions while at the same time 
adhering to the Code of Judicial Conduct on the pages of 
law journals and in the halls of the state capitol.  
However, populist sentiments remain high, and commitment 
judicial accountability through partisan elections appears 
to be the preferred judicial selection method for the 
citizens of the state of Texas for the foreseeable future.     
 Normative debate as to the proper value placed on 
judicial independence versus judicial accountability is 
beyond the scope of this project. Rather, I seek to explore 
how reformers react and craft strategy within this 
institutional design and how that context impacts the role 
of courts in policy making.  Long before beginning his 
political career, United States Senator John Cornyn 
pondered criticisms of state supreme court rulings and the 
connection to the ballot box by conjecturing, “In other 
words, if one does not like the law as decided by a 
particular set of judges, what more effective way to change 
the law than by changing judges at the next election?”
58
  If 
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that is the political context in which a court is situated, 
and as we have previously examined public law literature 
suggests political context does affect the extent to which 
a court will engage in policy making, then under what 
conditions will reformers choose court action versus 
legislative policy change?  Is Roch and Howard’s assertion 
that the functional lines between an elected court system 
and an elected legislature are blurred in this regard an 
accurate assessment, and, if so, how does that impact how 
reformers utilize courts?  
 
Institutional Design - Venues of Judicial and Quasi-
Judicial Reform in Texas 
 
As I have previously discussed, traditional American Public 
Law literature has emphasized an examination of the federal 
court system in order to understand the role of courts in 
policy reform.  While our understanding of courts and their 
relationship to reform strategy has been greatly enhanced 
by this body of work, an examination of the institutional 
structure of state courts in Texas reveals intricate and 
nuanced avenues of quasi-judicial reform, that is, reform 
strategy that is extra-legislative but not limited to a 
traditional court setting.  While judicial avenues include 
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state district courts, quasi-judicial avenues also include 
available avenues at the state level that do not have a 
federal equivalent.  Understanding how and when reformers 
utilize these various avenues at the state level, 
especially given the breadth and depth of policy within the 
state domain, contributes to our overall understanding of 
the role of courts in policy reform.    
There are four main ways that reformers engage in a 
judicial or quasi-judicial strategy when seeking a 
particular policy reform in Texas. 
 
Figure 1 






State District Court State Office of 
Administrative Hearings 












State District Court       
 
Reformers, depending on the opportunity structure, may seek 
reform in state district court.  Because Texas law requires 
a justiciable cause for court proceedings, reformers first 
must identify a controversy related to the policy outcome 
they are seeking before engaging a court in this manner.    
According to Article V of the Texas Constitution, 
district courts are the trial courts of general 
jurisdiction of Texas.  The geographical area served by 
each court is established by the Legislature, but each 
county must be served by at least one district court. In 
sparsely populated areas of the State, several counties may 
be served by a single district court, while an urban county 
may be served by many district courts.
59
  As previously 
discussed, each district court is presided over by a 
partisan-elected district court judge.   
 While the state district court functions in a similar 
manner to the federal district court, reform strategy can 
be influenced to an extent by the judicial selection 
process as the previously examined literature suggests.  
                                                 
59 http://www.courts.state.tx.us/courts/district.asp; March 7, 2012. 
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For example, reform strategy may include venue preferences 
based on the known political orientation of the judge.  The 
tort reform movement in Texas has been successful in 
influencing legislation to restrict venue shopping, but, 
depending on the policy arena, venue shopping is possible.   
While engaging the state district court in policy 
reform may conjure similarities to what we know about the 
federal district court and, generally speaking, the role of 
the federal court system in policy reform, its judicial 
selection mechanism as well as its orientation within the 
state context inclusive of the above identified quasi—
judicial avenues distinguishes its nature.  Sophisticated 
reformers view this avenue within its context; therefore, 
treating the state district court as a separate and 
distinct venue of reform from that of a federal district 
court can reveal fruitful insight about the relationship of 
courts to policy reform.               
 
Federal District Court 
 
While scholarship on how reformers utilize federal district 
court to engage in policy reform is developed and 
discussion of the institutional design of the American 
federal court system and its workings is unnecessary, it is 
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important to this study to orient this venue within the 
state policy reform landscape.  Sophisticated reformers 
certainly acknowledge federal district court as a viable 
venue of achieving state policy reform (depending on the 
nature of the issue), and understanding how and why state 
reformers utilize the federal court system in the context 
of the other identified venues is important to 
understanding the complex and nuanced business of policy 
reform.  For these reasons, it is important to acknowledge 




State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) 
 
A discussion of the role of courts in policy reform in 
Texas would be incomplete without examination of the role 
of the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH).  
Reformers in Texas may engage in quasi-judicial reform 
through the utilization of the SOAH, and, because of its 
breadth over everyday policy matters, understanding its 
role in the state government framework is critical to our 
overall understanding of the questions this project seeks 
to examine. 
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SOAH was created in 1991 by the Texas Legislature as a 
neutral, independent forum where Texas agencies or other 
governmental entities and private citizens or entities can 
resolve legal disputes.  According to Texas Government Code 
section 2003.021, SOAH is to conduct fair and objective 
administrative hearings and provide timely and efficient 
decisions.  These objectives are also reflected in the 
agency’s mission statement:  “…to conduct fair, prompt and 
efficient hearings and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 




The SOAH court is presided over by licensed attorney 
serving as a judge and serves the purpose of providing due 
process for persons and/or activities regulated by the 
state.  The presiding officer over a SOAH hearing is 
referred to as the ALJ, or administrative law judge (ALJ).  
The ALJ’s duties are: to be a neutral presiding officer 
acting independently of the referring agencies, conduct the 
hearing, listen to the evidence and arguments of the 
parties, and in some cases, issue a final decision.  All 
SOAH ALJs are licensed Texas attorneys.   
The SOAH court is divided into several teams according 
to subject matter and the state agencies that refer cases.  
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SOAH’s teams are as follows: Alternative Dispute 
Resolution; Administrative License Revocation and Field 
Enforcement; Economic; Licensing and Enforcement; Natural 
Resources; Tax; and Utilities.  This type of organizational 
structure creates specific areas of expertise within the 
agency’s judges and is considered to be highly technocratic 
in nature.   
SOAH literature describes an administrative hearing as  
 
…basically the same way as other trials with the 
parties, including the referring agency, presenting 
evidence to the ALJ, who acts as both judge and jury.  
The hearing is conducted independently of the agency 
that referred the case to SOAH, and the referring 
agency is prohibited from attempting to influence the 




Typically, the issuance of a decision by SOAH marks the end 
of the dispute in question.  However, Texas Statute permits 
a state agency to “disagree” with the decision of an ALJ.  
According to section 2001.058 of the Texas Government Code:   
(e)  A state agency may change a finding of fact or 
conclusion of law made by the administrative law 
judge, or may vacate or modify an order issued by the 
administrative judge, only if the agency determines: 
(1)  that the administrative law judge did not 
properly apply or interpret applicable law, agency 
rules, written policies provided under Subsection (c), 
or prior administrative decisions; (2)  that a prior 
administrative decision on which the administrative 
law judge relied is incorrect or should be changed;  
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While the statute lays out specific criteria by which an 
agency may vacate or modify an order of an ALJ, the 
criteria are broad enough to allow for significant agency 
discretion.   
Additionally, Texas Statue also provides for judicial 
review of ALJ decisions.  Section 2001.171 of the Texas 
Government Code states: “A person who has exhausted all 
administrative remedies available within a state agency and 
who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is 
entitled to judicial review under this chapter.”  Petition 
for judicial review of SOAH cases must be filed in Travis 
county district court.  District court judgments may also 
be appealed according to the standards of general civil 
actions. 
In FY 2010, SOAH reported a caseload of roughly 45,000 
cases.  Despite this large caseload, SOAH remains fairly 
insulated from the public eye.  The agency describes their 
public perception in their 2011-2015 Strategic Plan:  
 
Although administrative law is not a well-known area 
of the law outside the administrative law bar or 
Austin, where the agencies are headquartered, the work 
performed by SOAH, and by the agencies and entities 
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that refer cases to it, has an enormous public impact, 
far more than the public probably realizes. SOAH ALJs 
preside in hearings covering a wide range of subjects, 
including, for example, professional licensing and 
regulation of doctors, nurses, veterinarians, 
accountants, real estate agents, pharmacists, 
psychologists, dentists, teachers, insurance agents, 
electricians, plumbers, air conditioning technicians, 
and physical and occupational therapists; workers’ 
compensation medical benefits; teacher and state 
employee benefits; child support; child abuse and 
neglect; elder care; financial and utility regulation; 
the payment of taxes owed to the state; and 





In summary, the SOAH is a quasi-judicial venue for 
reformers.  While technically non-binding for state 
agencies and subject to judicial review for citizens, the 
SOAH has great breadth in dealing with everyday policy 
matters and is structured as an “efficient” gateway to the 
state district courts.  Additionally, the SOAH is the 
designated legal gateway for citizen’s to address and/or 
challenge the state in its regulatory role.  Perhaps it is 
this breadth and insular, technocratic nature of the SOAH 
that makes it a strategic venue for sophisticated insiders 
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Attorney General Opinions 
 
Reformers in Texas may also engage in quasi-judicial policy 
reform by engaging the Office of the Attorney General.  The 
Texas Attorney General is a statewide, partisan-elected 
official who serves a four year term.  The Attorney General 
is the official lawyer for the State of Texas and, 
according to the Texas Constitution, is charged with 
defending the laws and the Constitution of the State of 
Texas, representing the State in litigation, and approving 
public bond issues. Additionally, the Texas Constitution 
and section 402.042 of the Texas Government Code grant the 
Attorney General authority to issue attorney general 
opinions, a written interpretation of existing law.   
  An AG opinion cannot resolve a dispute or address 
matters of fact, but it can, generally speaking, provide 
legal clarity in grey areas of public policy.  Ordinary 
citizens cannot request AG opinions; rather only 
statutorily authorized requestors including the Governor, 
the head of a department or board of state government, the 
head or board of a penal institution, the head or board of 
an eleemosynary institution, a regent or trustee of a state 
educational institution, a committee of a house of the 
Texas Legislature, the chair or board of a river authority, 
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and a county auditor may request opinions.
64
 According to 
the office of the Attorney General’s website, “A person 
other than an authorized requestor who wants to ask for an 
attorney general opinion should approach someone who is 
named in section 402.042 as an authorized requestor.”
65
  
Authorized requestors, specifically elected officials, 
regularly petition the Attorney General on behalf of 
constituents who are non-authorized requestors, but this 
type of engagement in the state system requires a fairly 
sophisticated understanding of one’s available options.  
 The opinion drafting process is described by the 
Office of the Attorney General as follows: 
 
Once requested to write an attorney general opinion, 
the attorney general must interpret existing law in 
accordance with all applicable statutes and the 
Constitutions of the United States and the State of 
Texas. This process frequently involves extensive 
legal research by the group of assistant attorneys 
general known as the Opinion Committee. In addition to 
researching the law, the Committee solicits briefs 
from persons and groups that it deems likely to be 
affected by the opinion. The Committee welcomes 
additional briefs and any written commentary from the 
public, but the attorneys involved in the process do 
not engage in dialogue or explanation with interested 
parties or with the public. The draft opinion is 
reviewed by the attorney general and signed by the 
attorney general before it is issued. The written 
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After the issuance of the opinion, authorized requestors 
and/or their constituents may utilize the opinion to 
further a particular policy outcome or provide clarity in 
disputed matters, but the opinion is just that, a non-
binding opinion.  State agencies, whose legal 
representation is provided by the Office of the Attorney 
General, do not have to abide by attorney general opinions.  
According to the Office of the Attorney general, “Courts 
have stated that attorney general opinions are highly 
persuasive and are entitled to great weight. However, the 
ultimate determination of a law's applicability, meaning or 
constitutionality is left to the courts.”
67
   
 Because the Texas Attorney General is a statewide 
elected official and his opinions are non-binding, the 
utilization and impact of attorney general opinions in 
Texas and their role in policy reform differs from our 
understanding of the utilization and impact of the United 
States Attorney General.  Whereas the United States 
Attorney General is often seen as an extension of the 
President because the appointment structure, the Texas 
Attorney General is a separate and distinct political 
figure from the Texas Governor and the state agency boards 
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that the Governor appoints. And yet because of the partisan 
makeup of the state, the Texas Attorney general is often a 
member of the same political party as the Texas Governor. 
Consequences of this unique institutional configuration are 
discussed by Marshall: 
Not surprisingly, a divided executive creates 
substantial opportunities and incentives for conflict. 
First, there are matters of simple politics… Moreover, 
even when from the same party, the two officers can, 
and often are, divided by personal rivalries or 
ideological differences. And even when the  two 
officers  agree on  a particular  issue,  they may  
compete with  each other  to be  the most  aggressive  
in addressing  the issue to curry favor with  a 
particular constituency.  Add  to this  the political  
reality that  the Office  of  the Attorney  General  
has  long  been  seen  by many  of  its occupants  as 
a stepping  stone  to the Governor's  office and  the 





As argued by Marshall, the Office of the Attorney General 
in Texas is often viewed as a stepping stone to higher 
offices such as United States Senator or Governor, and 
consequently the “record” of the office holder has been 
utilized in a partisan manner.  The complexity of the 
political incentives that this institutional configuration 
creates is not lost on reformers seeking to influence a 
                                                 
68 Marshall, William P. “Break up the Presidency? Governors, State 
Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive,” The Yale 
Law Journal, Vol. 115, No. 9, The Most Dangerous Branch? Mayors, 
Governors, Presidents, and the Rule of Law: A Symposium on Executive 
Power (2006), pp. 2446-2479. 
 
 65 
particular policy outcome.  Meyer describes the unique 
power of this office in the state sphere: 
The heart of the attorney general's power is found in 
the constitutional and statutory arrangements that 
create the office. Although the exact allocation of 
litigation authority varies from state to state, 
attorneys general, for the most part, have a monopoly, 
or a near monopoly, on the state executive branch's 
access to the courtroom. This means that litigation as 
a method to advance policy interests is a tool that 
rests almost exclusively in the hands of the attorney 
general. Furthermore, because the attorney general is 
responsible for defending other state agencies in 
court, he may also be able to shape the policies of 





In addition, the politics of campaigning and assessment of 
the power structure among the Attorney General, Governor, 
and Legislature apply, and sophisticated reformers tend to 
be in tune with this dynamic.  It is because of this 
complexity that seeking an attorney general opinion is a 
strategic, quasi-judicial venue of reform.       
 
Taken together, it is evident that reformers in Texas have 
various avenues to pursue judicial or quasi-judicial 
strategies and that the institutional design of partisan 
elected judicial selection distinguishes this context from 
the American federal system literature, making questions 
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regarding the role of courts in policy reform in Texas a 
complex line of inquiry.  But before we examine such 
questions fully, we must also recognize that courts and 
quasi-judicial venues of reform do not exist in a vacuum.  
Rather, reformers have the traditional legislative route at 
their disposal for achieving policy change.  An examination 
of how these venues of reform fit together with regard to 
reform strategy and interest mobilization is therefore 
necessary to fully understand how reformers formulate and 
execute their strategies.      
 
Interest Mobilization in Texas 
 
Scholarly literature on interest mobilization in Texas also 
is largely focused on the legislative arena and the extent 
to which interest groups are entrenched into the political 
system.  Hamm and Wiggins describe interest mobilization 
with regard to the legislature in Texas, “Certainly groups 
play an important role as policy initiators and campaign 
supporters and financiers in many states; but the power 
that they exert could hardly be more significant than that 
wielded by their counterparts in the Lone Star State.” 
70
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They go on attribute the state’s weak party competition and 
highly fragmented governmental structure as reasons for 
“very influential” role interest groups have played in 
policymaking over the years.
71
  But to use Thomas’s 
definition of lobbyist, “a person designated by an interest 
group to represent it to government for the purpose of 
influencing public policy in that group’s favor,”
72
 it 
follows that one would evaluate all possible venues, 
including the courts, to achieve a desired policy outcome.  
If the role of the interest group is indeed “very 
influential” in the Texas political context and, as we have 
previously examined, the court system in Texas is highly 
responsive to the political context, then one would expect 
a rationally acting reformer to, at times, engage the court 
system in policy making.  Under what conditions does the 
court system or other quasi-judicial avenues become the 
venue of choice?   
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These questions may still stop short of the complexity of 
reform strategy when layered upon the Texas context. It is 
possible that not only the strategic interaction between 
the legislature and courts is more complex that originally 
contemplated, but also the strategic interaction among 
judicial and quasi-judicial venues themselves.  Thus, 
reformers not only have the ability to make strategic 
decisions with regard to a legislative versus court 
strategy but also among a variety of options within the 
court based strategy umbrella, or quasi-judicial venues.  
It is this complexity in state policy reform that this 






I hypothesize that reformers utilize institutions as a 
means to advance their policy goals as part of an overall 
strategy to accomplish an objective, rather than as ends 
that will deliver a specific outcome. As previously stated, 
the bulk of the public law literature has framed the 
decision of reformers to utilize a court to advance a 
policy goal as separate and distinct paths rather than 
connected and interdependent strategies.  However, 
examination of professionalized reform movements shows the 
strategic decisions of reformers to be more complex, the 
details of which I more fully understand through in-depth 
case study analysis. Generally speaking, reformers are 
utilizing the courts and available quasi-judicial venues 
(in Texas) in conjunction with a legislative strategy 
rather than as a standalone strategy.  My study reveals 
that reformers attempt to create synergistic environment 
between the legislative and judicial branches through 
complex maneuvering in order maximize their likelihood of 
success.   
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This project seeks to build upon the “new 
institutionalist” approach of understanding the 
relationship of courts to their larger political framework.  
Again by focusing on the external relationship of courts as 
institutions to other institutions in the political system, 
including interest groups and reformers, this project 
follows Gillman and Clayton’s orientation of the United 
States Supreme Court and external influences on decision-
making in which they state:  
 
The Court’s ability to persist and even thrive in this 
political system is a by-product if an unformalizable 
combination of considerations, including: the general 
social patterns of conflict and consensus that are 
generated by specific cultural, institutional, and 
class frameworks; the relationship between the Court’s 
jurisprudence and the beliefs, interests, and legal 
views of other powerful political actors such as 
Congress and the President; the ability of interest 
groups to mobilize support or opposition to the Court 
and its decisions; and the justice’s ability to cope 
with setbacks, adjust to changing circumstances and 






Clayton also asserts that promising areas of research will 
require scholars to view judicial acts within their 
political context and that the label of the approach 
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“matters less that the recognition that understanding the 
political meaning and significance of judicial decisions 
requires placing them in appropriate political contexts.”
74
  
This project seeks to understand the conditions by which 
the court is approached to engage in social policy reform 
and if the nature of action sought is limited to court 
decisions themselves.  Should reformers engage in multi-
venue reform then the desired behavior of a court may not 
be limited to a decision in one’s favor but to a variety of 
other outcomes that help advance a reformer’s agenda.  By 
examining the political context that precipitates court 
action and orienting a court within a particular political 
context as Clayton suggests, a deeper understanding of the 
significance of the role of courts in the policy making 
process will be gained.   
In addition, this project draws from the rational-
choice approach, or positive theory of institutions (PTI,) 
in that it assumes strategic behavior on the part of 
judges.  Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck’s define strategic 
interaction as “interdependent behavior with justice’s 
choices shaped, at least in part, by the preferences and 
likely actions of other relevant actors…Institutions 
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therefore influence strategic decision makers through two 
principal mechanisms – by providing information about 
expected behavior and by signaling sanctions for 
noncompliance.”
75
  This project broadens their discussion of 
strategic behavior of the Court (United States Supreme 
Court) to include the actions of reformers and legislators, 
because the institutional configuration that defines the 
rules of the game for judges in Texas also applies to 
reformers and legislators all attempting to achieve their 
preferred course of action.  Epstein and Knight add context 
to the concept of interdependence by defining strategic 
action by judges as the realization that their fate 
“depends on the preferences of other actors and the actions 
they are expected to take.”
76
  Gillman criticizes that PTI 
approach as an Attitudinal Model 2.0, reducing judicial 
decisions to individual preferences while recognizing the 
parameters of intuitional environment.
77
 Gillman argues for 
                                                 
75 Maltzman, Forrest, James Spriggs III, and Paul Wahlbeck, “Strategy 
and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court 
Decision-Making,” Clayton, Cornell and Howard Gillman, eds., Supreme 
Court Decision-Making: New Instutionalist Approaches. (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press) 1999.  p. 47. 
76 Epstein, Lee and Jack Kinight, “Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: 
The Informational Role of Amici Curiae,” Clayton, Cornell and Howard 
Gillman, eds., Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Instutionalist 
Approaches. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) 1999.  p. 217. 
77 Gillman, Howard, “The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): 
Interpretive Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court 
Decision-Making,” Clayton, Cornell and Howard Gillman, eds., Supreme 
Court Decision-Making: New Instutionalist Approaches. (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press) 1999.   
 
 73 
a more holistic, “interpretivist” approach that also takes 
into account factors such as institutional mission.   
However, this project seeks to understand the nature 
of the relationship among various actors within a given 
political context but across specific institutional 
contexts.  The research questions at the heart of this 
inquiry are not limited to just the strategic decision 
making of judges but include the decision making processes 
of the reformers to approach the court in the first place 
based on the combined expectations of judicial and 
legislative action, therefore the discussion of 
institutional mission is not salient.  Because the PTI 
approach recognizes the strategic interaction and 
interdependence of relevant actors in a broad sense, it 
does provide an inclusive framework for examining decision 
making.              
 
Case Study Approach 
 
In order to explore the questions presented in this study, 
I examine three reform movements in Texas in an in-depth 
manner.  Through this in-depth case study analysis, I 
examine pathways of reform and the reform strategies 
utilized by those seeking policy changes.  Research 
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gathered in this study stems largely from interviews and 
in-depth observation of reform movements and reform leaders 
operating within the Texas political and institutional 
context as well as first hand experiences associated with 
the particular case studies.  This research study 
represents an exercise in theory development regarding the 
use of courts and quasi-judicial institutions by reformers 
engaged in policy change and is designed to lay the 
foundation for further study in this area.    
Specifically, this study employs the comparative case 
study approach.  According to Ragin, comparative case-
oriented researchers see cases as complex configurations of 
events and structures rather than homogenous observations 
drawn at random from a fixed population of equally 
plausible selections.
78
  In this type of research, “concepts 
are revised and refined as the boundary of the set of 
relevant cases is shifted and clarified. Important 
theoretical distinctions often emerge from this dialogue of 
ideas and evidence.”
79
  Following the selection of relevant 
cases, the next step is to identify the causal conditions 
that the cases share.
80
  Finally, once the “theoretically 
relevant causal commonalities have been identified, the 
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investigator constructs a composite portrait of the 
phenomenon under investigation.”
81
  This “theory-laden and 
concept-intensive process” 
82
 will be employed to examine 
the questions outlined in this project.  
I depart from Przeworski and Teune
83
 as well as Hall
84
 
in their contention that this strategy is relatively 
limited in providing generalizable knowledge.  Rather, as 
argued in Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, I break 
from the view that the use of small “n” comparative 
historical work cannot belong to the “context of 
validation.”
85
 By employing a strategy of analytic 
induction, or building arguments from the understanding of 
individual histories and then identifying potential 
theoretical insights, one is able to test and retest 
generalizations in other case analyses.
86
  Therefore, 
through analytic induction, case studies are of great 
theoretical value in that they can be hypothesis-
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generating, providing theoretical generalizations in areas 
where theory is yet to exist.
87




Again, following the comparative case-oriented method as 
described by Ragin, I view each case as a” …whole entity 
purposefully selected and comprising of a complex 
arrangement of events.”
 88
  The case studies selected for 
investigation are: the scope of practice battle between 
engineers and architects, transportation infrastructure, 
and voter ID.    
 
Building Design – Engineers versus Architects Scope of 
Practice 
 
Much of the business of policy reform with regard to state 
policy deals with highly technocratic areas of policy 
involving the regulation of professions.  In Texas, the 
professions of engineering and architecture are both 
regulated by licensing acts.  From time to time, disputes 
arise between and among professions as to who may provide a 
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particular service as did between the engineers and 
architects over the issue of building design.  While this 
case study is certainly not the only example of a scope of 
practice battle in Texas, it is a representative example of 
a fairly large portion of policy reform at the state level.  
Therefore, in order to gain insight in to the strategy of 
reformers at the state level, it is important to include an 




While not as technical in nature as policy reform related 
to licensing statutes, the case study of transportation 
infrastructure represents a broad based reform movement 
lead by sophisticated reformers that does not rise to a 
high level of polarization related to the political 
climate.  Policy change sought by reformers in this arena 
is related to public goods and infrastructure and is 
therefore also not typically defined by traditional party 








The issue of Voter ID is representative of a highly 
politically salient topic.  It is also a case in which high 
degrees of polarization exist.  Policy change related to 
voter ID was also highly publicized by the media and 
therefore presumed to be an issue that the electorate would 
have some knowledge of, at least more so than the above 
mentioned case studies.  Reformers seeking change in this 
arena would be expected to craft strategies based on 
perceptions of linkages between decision makers and their 
party and/or constituency.      
 
Each case study selected has been a significant issue in 
Texas state politics from 2005-2011.  Major reform has been 
attempted on all of the issues selected in this time 
period, controlling for variation in political climate.  
However, these cases vary on many different factors and 
have quite different stories and endings.  Each is rich in 
detail about the nature of partisan divides, nature of 
issues, etc.  Although I cannot tease out the importance of 
each factor individually, I highlight through rich detail, 
as is often done with in-depth case studies, how, why, and 
when reformers utilized court based reform in their 
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endeavors to achieve policy change in an effort to better 
understand what these decision makers thought they were 
doing.   
Because state policy making encompasses issues ranging 
from the mundane and technocratic to the highly polarizing, 
variation in types of issues will allow for us to see if 
reformers utilize multi-venue approaches in varying 
political environments.  The following diagram summarizes 
the case study selection of this project according to 
political salience.  
 
Figure 2 
Political Salience Spectrum of Selected Cases 
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Why vary cases by political salience?  It is important 
to note that not all issues are equally politically salient 








achieved for issues with a high degree of political 
salience because of their alignment with party politics, or 
do multi-venue strategies play a role technical policy 
issues as well?   Given the institutional and political 
context in which reformers in Texas operate, do they 
formulate similar reform strategies for issues spanning the 
politically salient spectrum or is reform strategy wholly 
issue specific?   
For the purposes of this study “political salience” is 
simply a backdrop of variation among cases.  Should 
interdependent, multi-venue approaches be revealed through 
cases study analysis across an issue spectrum, we may be 
able to better generalize how reformers formulate reform 
strategy.  I am employing a simple definition of “political 
salience,” that is an issue that it a litmus test for the 
primary voter, not simply Republican versus Democrat.  When 
studying issues in contemporary Texas politics it is also 
important to examine issues that are not simply Democrat or 
Republican but also, with the advent of the Tea Party, the 
degree to which it is Republican.  By defining political 
salience as an issue that is a litmus test for the primary 
voter, we can capture this nuance in Texas state politics.  





Should interdependent, multi-venue approaches be revealed 
through cases study analysis across an issue spectrum, we 
may be able to better generalize how reformers formulate 
reform strategy.  The utilization of each venue in a way 
that affects the issue in the other venue would support the 
contention that reformers craft strategies that utilize 
both legislative and judicial venues in tandem.  Indicators 
of an interdependent, multi-venue approach would include, 
but are not limited to, the utilization of legislative 
processes in order to impact court proceedings and/or the 
specific utilization of court action or inaction by 
reformers in the act of legislative lobbying.  Conclusions 
will then be drawn as to the behavior of reformers within 
the Texas political context and the subsequent implications 




The primary method of data collection for this study is 
participant observation.  Nachmias and Nachmias describe 
participant observation as a method whereby: 
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…the investigator attempts to attain some kind of 
membership or close attachment to the group he or she 
wishes to study.  In doing so, the participant 
observer attempts to adopt the perspectives of the 
people in the situation being observed.  The 
participant observer’s role is that of conscious and 
systematic sharing in…the activities of a group of 
persons. 
89
   
 
 
Specifically, in the participant-as-observer role, 
“researchers make long-term commitments to becoming active 
members and attempt to establish close relationships with 
members of the group who subsequently serve as both 
informants and respondents.”
90
  Within this method, the 
researcher “gains a deeper appreciation of the group…and 
may also gain different levels of insight by actually 
participating rather than only observing.”
91
   
 Since 2005, I have been actively engaged in reform 
movements in Texas through observation as well as direct 
participation as a reformer.  The participant-as-observer 
method of data collection serves as the primary method of 
data collection for this study and is enhanced by 
interviews and where appropriate secondary data sources 
such as newspaper articles, public testimony, and archival 
documents.     
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We often examine political processes through highly 
salient, grand battles.  Indeed such issues are well 
documented in terms of media coverage and party platforms.  
However, the vast majority of issues, particularly in the 
state legislative context, tend to be more technical, and 
perhaps to the general public even mundane.  It is in the 
day to day business of political processes that we as 
political scientists can learn a great deal about the 
nature of our political institutions and the strategies 
that decision makers regularly employ.  The scope of 
practice battle between engineers and architects in Texas 
provides a wonderful window into how an issue of relatively 
low political salience traverses legislative and legal 
institutions in a complex way.             
Complex strategy and the utilization of both 
legislative and legal institutions by reformers are well 
illustrated by an in-depth examination of the scope of 
practice battle between engineers and architects in Texas.  
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Scope of practice issues are known for being particularly 
difficult and nasty because by definition they involve 
state regulated professions that do not often break along 
typical partisan lines and involve impassioned fundamental 
questions regarding one’s ability to practice his 
profession and put food on the proverbial table.  
Consequently, successful strategies in this policy realm 
tend to be highly complex due to the difficulty in 
translating the plight of a specific profession to the 
general voter and the tendency of professions to view scope 
of practice issues as “die on their sword” in nature.  The 
scope of practice battle between the engineers and 
architects waged over two decades in Texas exemplifies 
these characteristics.  Former Texas Society of 
Professional Engineers President Patrick Kunz, PE described 
the conflict: 
The architect/engineer issue was an extremely 
contentious issue between two highly regarded 
professions.  These practitioners are quite passionate 
about their area of practice and each saw the other as 
encroaching on their area of expertise, resulting in a 
total mistrust in each other and a passionate battle 
with emotions raised to a level that made it almost 




Through an in-depth examination of this scope of practice 
battle, the complex nature of the utilization of 
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legislative and legal entities by reformers seeking policy 
change will be demonstrated.  Moreover, because the 
regulation of trade by states to protect the public health, 
safety, and welfare represents such an integral component 
of the business of state government, an understanding of 
reform strategy and its complexity in this regard will 
hopefully provide further insight in the context of 
American public law literature.     
The 45
th
 Texas Legislature created the Engineering 
Practice Act over 70 years ago, within sixty-one days of 
the tragic “New London School Disaster” in which a natural 
gas leak caused an explosion that killed more than 295 
students and teachers in New London, Texas.  The Act made 
it unlawful for anyone to practice engineering, 
specifically the design of public buildings, unless they 
were authorized by the State Board for Registration of 
Professional Engineers to do so. Civil and criminal 
penalties were prescribed for violations, and the Attorney 
General was specifically directed to provide legal 
assistance to enforce the Act. 
          In 1965, the Legislature broadened the definition 
of professional engineering, stating that it includes: 
“any service or creative work, either public or 
private, the performance of which requires engineering 
education, training and experience in the application 
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of special knowledge of the mathematical, physical, or 
engineering sciences to such services or creative 
work.” Sec. 2.4 art. 3271a. 
 
That language is substantially the same today, but with 
many more examples of what constitutes engineering.  In 
Texas, engineers are licensed to practice engineering 
without being limited to a specific field of 
specialization.  Licensed engineers have the statutory 
right to practice in any engineering field for which they 
have the appropriate education and experience.  For 
example, mechanical engineers routinely practice both 
mechanical and electrical engineering. It is also common 
practice for civil engineers to practice civil and 
structural engineering in building design projects. 
Conversely, even though a licensed chemical engineer has 
the statutory right to practice in any engineering field, 
it is doubtful that a chemical engineer would have the 
education or experience to practice structural engineering.  
Architectural engineering (i.e. engineering for design of 
buildings) is a unique and highly specialized field of 
practice and is the specific area of engineering that is at 
the heart of this bitter scope of practice battle.  
Like the Engineering Practice Act, the current 
Architecture Practice Act also resulted from the “New 
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London School Disaster.” Until 1989, however, the 
architects operated under a “title” act. What constituted 
the practice of architecture was not defined, and there was 
no limit on who could engage in building design, except for 
section 19 of the original Engineering Practice Act, 
discussed above, which required that an engineer design 
such buildings. No law regulated the practice of 
architecture until 1989. As described in the brief 
submitted to the Attorney General of the Texas Society of 
Professional Engineers and the Consulting Engineers Council 
of Texas:  
There was no law regulating architects in the true 
sense of a practice act until the 71
st
 session of the 
Texas Legislature in 1989.  The original act was 
enacted in 1937…it was primarily an exclusive right to 
use the title architect – a truth in advertising or 
labeling law.  Only those licensed by the architect’s 
board could call themselves architects….From 1937 to 
1989 the architect’s law remained primarily a truth in 
advertising law.  Anyone was free to do anything an 
architect did so long as he did not call himself an 
architect.
93
   
 
In 1989, the Texas Legislature defined the practice of 
architecture and required a license under the Architecture 
Practice Act to engage in that practice.  
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Reconciling Chapter 1001 of the Texas Occupations 
Code, the Engineering Practice Act, with Chapter 1051 of 
the Texas Occupations Code, the Architecture Practice Act, 
and the predecessors of those provisions has a long history 
in Texas. Because each licensing Act exempts those licensed 
under the other licensing Act, it is clear that the 
professions of engineering and architecture overlap in the 
area of building design.  The Board of Architectural 
Examiners has interpreted the law to prohibit engineers 
from designing buildings intended for human use and 
occupation and to limit engineers to designing engineering 
aspects of buildings. The Board of Professional Engineers 
has disagreed with that interpretation, concluding that 
building design may be performed exclusively by a licensed 
professional engineer competent in this field.   
When two state agencies in Texas disagree regarding 
interpretations of statute, they may request an Attorney 
General’s opinion to provide further guidance as to the 
meaning of the law.  As previously discussed, according to 
Texas statue, Chairs of state agencies are authorized 
requestors and may make an Attorney General Opinion 
request.  Because the Office of the Attorney General is the 
official legal council of state agencies, attorneys in the 
Office of the Attorney General advise their client agencies 
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and ultimately can submit legal requests and briefs to the 
“Opinion Division” of the Office of the Attorney General.  
Under this model, attorneys representing state agencies 
from the Office of the Attorney General pose official 
questions to their co-workers in the same office.  This 
detail is not meant to lead one to believe that requests 
are not taken seriously, but rather to establish that the 
relationship among attorneys involved in this process is 
familiar in nature because they all work together for the 
same boss – the Attorney General.      
The Texas Board of Architectural Examiners decided to 
ask for a formal Attorney General Opinion on their ability 
to take disciplinary action against licensed professional 
engineers for engaging in building design which was in 
their interpretation constituting the practice of 
architecture.  Theoretically, either board could make an 
official inquiry, but since it was the Texas Board of 
Architectural Examiners who wanted to take action against 
engineers and not the other way around, they made the 
initial request.   
It is important to note the opportunity structure and 
context of the strategic decision making by the Texas Board 
of Architectural Examiners.  First, the board, as with most 
state boards, is made up of gubernatorial appointees.  
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According to Texas lobbyist Jerry Valdez,
94
 it is common 
understanding of political insiders that a channel of 
unofficial communication between agency appointees and the 
Governor’s office is alive and well.  While the Office of 
the Governor would likely not officially get involved in an 
agency disputes, it is common understanding that they are 
aware of them from both sides.  Second, according to a 
former trade association executive, while state licensing 
boards operate independently from state trade and industry 
associations, there are open lines of communication between 
agencies and their constituents through trade associations.  
Often trade associations make recommendations to the 
Governor’s office for board appointments and in some 
circumstances, appointed board members also serve in 
association leadership positions.  When the decision making 
of an agency and trade association is consolidated, the 
reform strategy is assumed to be collaborative.  Third, 
since the Office of the Attorney General represents both 
the Texas Board of Architectural Examiners and the Texas 
Board of Professional Engineers, an official Attorney 
General Opinion would be the first step in the agencies 
battling one another in legal arena as unofficial obstacles 
within the Office of the Attorney General prevent agencies 
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suing each other directly.  Finally, state agencies are 
prohibited by statute from engaging in legislative 
lobbying. Most boards rely on a strong relationship with 
trade association to accomplish legislative goals.   Thus, 
if the consolidated architect strategy (the Board and the 
trade association combined) was to have the Board make the 
first move, institutional constraints require that the 
Board pursue legal rather than legislative remedies.  The 
context of the Attorney General Opinion request by the 
Texas Board of Architectural Examiners is significant 
because it sheds light on the opportunity structure and 
strategic interaction of the stakeholders involved in this 
dispute – the respective boards and the industry trade 
associations.   
Three briefs were filed in conjunction with the 
opinion request, and the arguments laid out by each 
stakeholder group provide great insight into the nature of 
the dispute itself.  The Texas Society of Architects 
submitted an amicus brief in which they argued:   
Upon reviewing the plans, the Board determined 
that these plans were architectural plans and had 
not been prepared and sealed by a registered 
architect.  Therefore, the Board determined that 
the engineer who prepared these plans had 
violated Article 249a…If the nature if the 
request is meant to include the resolution of the 
question of whether the plans are architectural 
plans or engineering plans, such request requires 
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the determination of a fact question.  However, 
the Board has already determined that the plans 
in question and prepared by the engineer were 
architectural and not engineering plans.  This 
finding is clearly within the authority of the 
Board in its duty to enforce the law to prevent 




According to trade association insiders, unofficially the 
Texas Board of Architectural Examiners had shared their 
initial opinion request with the Texas Society of 
Architects, and the Texas Society of Architects offered to 
unofficially help with drafting the question.  However, the 
Texas Board of Architectural Examiners went forward with 
submitting their question without the aid of the Texas 
Society of Architects at the direction of their executive 
director who was leery of industry participation, although 
such participation is not legally prohibited.  The Texas 
Society of Architects was less than pleased with the 
particular drafting of the questions because they were in 
their view too open-ended.  Strategically, the legal 
counsel for the Texas Society of Architects had advised to 
never pose a question where you can’t direct an answer.  
The Texas Society of Architects brief was meant to mitigate 
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what they perceived to be a misstep in the drafting of the 
opinion request.   
The Texas Board of Professional Engineers, under 
advisement from their own Office of the Attorney General 
legal counsel, cited other scope of practice battles in 
their brief establishing a legislative history of 
overlapping scope in other professions and left the heavy 
hitting to the engineer industry associations:  
In opinion number JM-795, the Attorney general 
addresses the functional overlap of state licensed 
plumber and air conditioning contractors.  JM 795 
concluded the two regulated trades were not mutually 
exclusive, in that the Legislature considered some 
aspects of air conditioning contracting to also 




For the Texas Board of Professional Engineers, an overlap 
with the practice of architecture was not of great concern 
from a territorial standpoint because the overlap 
encompassed only a small facet of engineering, 
architectural engineering.  But for the Texas Society of 
Architects, at stake was the very definition of 
architecture – if an engineer can do architecture, then 
what is special and unique about being an architect?   
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 Finally, the Texas Society of Professional Engineers 
and the Texas Council of Engineering Companies submitted a 
brief that took the engineers argument a step further: 
Long before the architect’s statue was ever enacted 
and for more than half a century since then 
professional engineers and consulting engineering 
firms have been preparing engineering plans and 
specifications for public buildings of every nature 
and performing the overall design of such buildings 
without any public outcry from the State of Texas or 
the general public…It is indeed regrettable that the 
Attorney General should be disturbed with this issue.  
Architecture and Engineering are respected but 





Defining the overlap between the practices was both 
problematic and unnecessary for the engineers:  
Courts and legislatures have been attempting, for more 
than a century, to define and distinguish between the 
practice of engineering and architecture…Architecture 
and engineering are definitely separate and distinct 
professions; however, in the area of designing 
buildings they frequently overlap.  Most state laws 
make it clear that architects are to design 
architectural plans and engineers are to design 
engineering plans…Frustrations arise for legislatures 
and courts when a dispute gets down to the issue of 
whether a specific set of plans and specifications are 
architectural plans or engineering plans.  Scholars 
and courts have solved the problem by saying that as 
far as the public safety, health and welfare are 
concerned it doesn’t make any difference.  Both 
disciplines are well trained by education and 
experience to design buildings…The federal government 
and most state governments have long since abandoned 
any effort to distinguish architectural vis-à-vis 
engineering services for contracting purposes.  The 
standard practice of all of the major federal agencies 
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is to designate contracts for all kinds of buildings 




As a result of the Texas Board of Architectural Examiners 
request for opinion, Attorney General Dan Morales issued 
opinion DM-161 which states that the architect’s act:  
 ...does not bar a professional engineer licensed under 
article 3271a, V.T.C.S., from preparing the plans and 
specifications, the preparation of which requires the 
application of engineering principles and the 
interpretation of engineering data, for 'a new 
building that is to be constructed and owned by a 
State agency, a political subdivision of this State, 
or any other public entity in this State if the 
building will be used for education, assembly, or 





The opinion also states that "…Licensed engineers continue 
to have the authority to prepare building designs and 
specifications that they had prior to the adoption…in 
1989."   
This opinion was perceived to be a victory for the 
engineers.  However, as previously discussed an opinion of 
the Attorney General is not binding and may actually change 
with the election of a new Attorney General.  State 
agencies do have statutory latitude to “disagree” with an 
official Attorney General Opinion, but to do so is out of 
the ordinary because of the political costs at stake.  
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Recall that that state boards operate under the direction 
of gubernatorial appointees and that unofficial 
communication between appointees and the office of the 
Governor is common place.  Under normal circumstances, a 
state board might be unofficially discouraged from further 
action as rejecting an Attorney General Opinion may be 
viewed as “going rogue.”  But this can depend on the nature 
of the relationship between the Governor and the Attorney 
General as political figures and the relevance of the issue 
at stake.  Also, recall that scope of practice battles tend 
to be “die on their sword” issues.  For the architects, DM-
161 meant that architecture was relegated to a subset of 
engineering.  Furthermore, because the Office of the 
Attorney General represents the agency, there is no actual 
cost of continuing the fight against architectural 
engineers.  Individual engineers, on the other hand, under 
enforcement action by the Texas Board of Architectural 
Examiners would have bare the cost of a legal defense.   
The Texas Board of Architectural Examiners issued the 
following official response directed to Attorney General 
Dan Morales:      
The Texas Board of Architectural Examiners 
respectfully requests that you withdraw and reconsider 
your opinion of DM 161…the conclusion of the Opinion 
is clearly erroneous.”  …”The Opinion is also flawed 
because it makes a finding of fact to support the 
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erroneous conclusion…that is beyond the purview of the 
Opinion process and cannot be made by an Opinion of 
the Attorney General but only by a judge or jury of by 
a state agency to which such authority is given by the 
Legislature.
100
    
 
 
According to former trade association staff, General 
Morales communicated unofficially with the Texas Society of 
Architects that he felt that he had made a bigger mess of 
things with the issuance of DM-161, but could not issue a 
retraction because he had recently issued a retraction on a 
different matter.  Too many retractions would have a 
negative political affect.   
After suffering a perceived defeat, the relationship 
between the Texas Society of Architects and the Texas Board 
of Architectural Examiners was damaged according to those 
involved.  The Texas Society of Architects considered a 
legislative solution at this time, but were advised by 
their lobby counsel to wait until their practice act, which 
had just been passed a few years before, had time to be 
better established.  Without a legislative strategy, The 
Texas Society of Architects urged the Board of 
Architectural Examiners to seek a new Attorney General 
Opinion.  Fearing further negative consequences, the Board 
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decided to wait.  Meanwhile, the Texas Board of 
Architectural Examiners and the Texas Board of Professional 
Engineers began discussions on how to try to work together 
to resolve issues of overlap within their statutory 
authority.  
To recap, those involved in this dispute had utilized 
a quasi-judicial strategy to bring about a resolution to 
the dispute by seeking an Attorney General Opinion.  Recall 
that resolving the dispute has been previously identified 
as one way in which reformers decide to utilize a quasi-
judicial strategy. This opinion was perceived to be a 
victory by the Texas Board of Professional Engineers; 
however, the architects (both association and licensing 
board) did not give up.  Therefore, despite a victory in 
this realm, the end goal of resolving the dispute in this 
arena was not achieved.   
In 2001, the Texas Board of Architectural Examiners 
was slated to go though the Texas Sunset Review process, a 
legislatively created process by meant to identify and 
eliminate waste, duplication, and inefficiency in 
government agencies.  All state agencies go through this 
process on a statutorily outlined cycle.  Due to a 
consolidation of cycles by industry sector, the Texas Board 
of Architectural Examiners and Texas Board of Professional 
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Engineers were set to be examined in tandem in 2003.  
Recall that agencies are statutorily prohibited from 
legislative lobbying.  However, during Sunset Review 
process agencies provide a self-evaluation report to the 
Sunset Advisory Commission, and through this mechanism are 
able to identify suggested clean-up, clarification, and 
policy changes to their statues.  The Texas Board of 
Architectural Examiners utilized this opportunity to 
address the overlap issue. According to their 2001 Self-
Evaluation Report:  
Article 249a mandates that an architect prepare the 
architectural plans and specifications for certain 
types of buildings, such as all institutional 
residential facilities and certain government 
buildings. However, there has been significant 
confusion regarding the meaning of these requirements. 
For example, some engineers who have designed such 
buildings from start to finish without the involvement 
of architects argue that no “architectural” plans and 
specifications were prepared. The law should be 
revised to eliminate this ambiguity. If the intent of 
the law is for an architect to be involved in certain 
types of projects, the law should clearly state that 





Addressing the issue in this environment provided the 
agency with the opportunity structure to pursue a 
legislative channel.  In doing so, this evidences 
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 conception of opportunity structures in that the 
actors themselves created and manipulated opportunities 
through incentivizing decision makers to act.  The Texas 
Board of Professional Engineers did not address the issue 
in their self-evaluation report because in their view, DM-
161 provided an adequate answer to the question.  For the 
engineers, bringing the issue up would signify ambiguity 
where they believed clarity existed in an engineer’s 
ability to design buildings.     
 The legislative outcome of the Sunset Process was to 
establish a Joint Advisory Committee (quasi-governmental 
committee) between the Texas Board of Architectural 
Examiners and Texas Board of Professional Engineers with 
the mission of addressing issues of overlap.  The 
architects (the association and the Board) perceived this 
to be a victory because in their view addressing the 
overlap was equated to defining the overlap i.e. what 
constituted architectural plans.  For the engineers, on the 
other hand, addressing the overlap meant creating a process 
by which the agencies would examine each other’s licensees.  
In their view, since engineers could legally perform 
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building design, their desired outcome was for the Texas 
Board of Architectural Examiners to refer questions about 
licensed engineers to the engineer’s board, the appropriate 
authority for disciplinary action against engineers.  
 By all accounts, the Joint Advisory Committee (JAC) 
was a colossal failure.  The JAC was required to hold their 
hearings under the Open Meetings Act and activities of the 
JAC were subject to open records law.  The result was a 
series of hearings over a two year period where each side 
publically displayed their position.  It was clear to the 
associations that little was being accomplished in this 
forum, and, in order to resolve the issue, either the 
associations would have to convince the Boards to come to 
an agreement or go back to the legislature for a 
resolution.  
 Rather than begin an all out legislative battle, the 
associations at this point began unofficial negotiations in 
an attempt to present an agreed upon memorandum of 
understanding to the JAC.  The opportunity structure was 
strategically assessed by those involved that it would be 
easier to convince JAC Board members of a solution than 
legislators because of the close connection between the 
associations and the Boards.  These negotiations were 
between the Texas Society of Architects and the Texas 
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Council of Engineering Companies, the business association 
of Texas engineering firms.  The Texas Society of 
Professional Engineers was not involved in the negotiations 
at this point in time which turned out to be significant to 
the negotiation process.  Tensions were heightening between 
the professions to the point that from a business 
perspective the issue required resolution.  Engineering 
companies commonly have numerous architects and with the 
involvement of each association in this battle, such firms 
were paying a significant portion of the dues for engineers 
and architect to wage this battle through the Texas Society 
of Architects and the Texas Society of Professional 
Engineers, the society representing individual engineers 
with an emphasis on the profession of engineering.  It was 
not uncommon for partners in A/E firms to be on opposite 
sides of this ongoing dispute.  The Texas Society of 
Professional Engineers and Council of Engineering Companies 
have an unofficial policy of not fighting each other 
legislatively, so for the Council of Engineering Companies 
to be successful in resolving this dispute their best venue 
was by influencing the JAC.  
 Negotiations between the Texas Society of Architects 
and the Council of Engineering Companies progressed along 
the lines of defining each profession with more 
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specificity.  However, this line of negotiation was seen by 
the Texas Society of Professional Engineers to be 
relinquishing part of the profession of engineering since 
engineers could engage in building design.  The Texas 
Society of Professional Engineers requested an official 
Policy Advisory Opinion from the Texas Board of 
Professional Engineers, a statutory authority granted by 
the legislature during the 2003 Sunset process, asking the 
question if a licensed professional engineer practicing in 
his/her area of competency could engage in comprehensive 
building design.  The Board issued their opinion that this 
was well within the statutory authority of the Engineering 
Practice Act, and consequently could not agree to further 
defining the practice of engineering as was contemplated by 
the JAC process because the legislature had not granted 
them the authority to do so.  The JAC, at this point, was 
defunct. 
 Without a functioning JAC, tensions were higher than 
ever between the professions.  With staff changes and time, 
relationships were mended between the Texas Board of 
Architectural Examiners and the Texas Society of 
Architects.  This time, with the unofficial aid of the 
Texas Society of Architects, the Texas Board of 
Architectural Examiners requested an Attorney General 
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opinion related to the Texas Board of Engineers Policy 
Advisory opinion on building design.  In 2006, the Texas 
Board of Architectural Examiners filed complaints against 
two licensed engineers engaged in building design for 
practicing architecture.  One week later, Attorney General 
Greg Abbott issued a different opinion, GA-0391, in 
response to the Texas Board of Architectural Examiners 
request which stated: 
Chapters 1001 and 1051 of the Occupations Code do not 
provide a basis to answer categorically whether an 
engineer may comprehensively design a building without 
the involvement of an architect...Rather, the answer 
to that question will depend on whether the adequate 
performance of the particular service or work requires 
a person with engineering education, training, and 
experience.  Whether adequate performance of a 
particular service or work requires a person with 
engineering education, training, and experience is a 
question of fact that cannot be resolved in the 
opinion process.
103
   
 
Interestingly, according to newsletters published by both 
the Texas Society of Architects and Texas Society of 
Professional Engineers, both sides claimed the opinion as a 
victory, and the Texas Board of Architectural Examiners 
continued to pursue disciplinary action proceedings against 
the engineers.    
In January of 2007, as the cases against the engineers 
in question meandered through the administrative law 
                                                 




 Legislative Session of the Texas 
Legislature was getting into full swing.  The Texas Society 
of Professional Engineers (TSPE) saw an opportunity to 
solve the dispute legislatively by clarifying the law as it 
pertained to the issue of building design, thereby 
clarifying the activity of the engineers in question in the 
disciplinary action proceedings.  This strategy was chosen 
by TSPE because in the view of these reformers, while 
unpredictable because of the nature of the issue, the 
legislative process was finite and they could retain 
control of the statutory language through the process.  
Because their lobbyist was writing the legislation, a 
standard practice in the Texas system, they could be 
reasonably assured that they would be happy with the 
legislation should it be successful in passing.  In their 
view, they would not have this degree of control in the 
court system, and the issue was ripe for legislative 
action.  The Council of Engineering Companies did not 
oppose this strategy by TSPE, but they in essence remained 
neutral due to the significant amount of architects 
employed by the member engineering firms. 
Knowing the Texas Society of Architects would likely 
be monitoring all proposed legislation involving building 
design, TSPE engaged in an “under the radar” approach; the 
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organization proceeded by having a legislator file what 
lobbyists refer to as a “vehicle,” a piece of benign 
legislation that is able to move through the legislative 
process with little attention but that is also germane to 
the more controversial issue that one is seeking to 
address.  By moving a vehicle, TSPE only needed the support 
of the bill’s author to amend the bill’s language in the 
final hours of the legislative session.  One just hopes 
that no one notices the last minute change in the language.  
According to seasoned reformers, this type of scope of 
practice issue was not likely to receive board legislative 
support because most legislators would fear retaliation at 
the voting booth by either the architects or engineers in 
their districts across the state.  This attempt was 
ultimately not successful, and the dispute continued.    
In June of 2007, immediately after the legislative 
session, the Texas Society of Professional Engineers filed 
suit against the Texas Board of Architectural Examiners 
raising several issues related to their rulemaking and 
jurisdiction, and, according to former TSPE President Pat 
Kunz, their motivations for doing so were simply to resolve 
the dispute.
104
  Because the issue in question was related 
to state agency rulemaking, the matter was under the 
                                                 
104 Personal Interview, September 10, 2011. 
 107 
jurisdiction of the State Office of Administrative Hearings 
(SOAH).  The SOAH judge ruled that the rules in question 
were overbroad and invalidated the rules by which the Texas 
Board of Architectural Examiners were citing to discipline 
engineers practicing building design.  However, the SOAH 
judge also ruled the licensed engineers were prohibited 
from practicing architecture without a license but did not 
determine if the plans in question constituted 
architecture.    
Meanwhile, the cases against the specific engineers 
were dismissed by summary judgment by the SOAH judge in 
February of 2008.  The Texas Board of Architectural 
Examiners held another hearing on the contested cases on 
the specific engineers in question, ignoring the summary 
judgment, and voted to take action against the engineers in 
question for practicing architecture without a license 
because they had determined that the plans in question were 
architectural in nature.  The engineers in question then 
appealed to the District Court.   
When the 81
st
 Texas Legislative Session began in 
January of 2009, tensions between the professions remained 
very high.  It was the desire of the Texas Society of 
Professional Engineers to again attempt a legislative 
resolution because of the uncertainty of the judicial 
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process and the mounting legal bills associated with the 
cases.  The Texas Society of Architects, on the other hand, 
was not involved in the cases financially speaking.  The 
Texas Board of Architectural Examiners, a state agency, was 
waging the battle for the architects in the court system; 
therefore, legislative reform was not as high of a priority 
for the Texas Society of Architects.  According to TSA 
staff, TSA’s strategy for the 81
st
 Legislative Session was 
simply not to lose any statutory ground.  Finding little to 
no legislative appetite for taking the issue head on, a 
similar approach as the previous session, or “under the 
radar” approach, was contemplated and attempted by the 
Texas Society of Professional Engineers, with the Council 
of Engineering Companies remaining neutral.  Numerous 
legislators were approached to consider legislation but few 
were willing to wade into what they considered to be a 
nasty scope of practice battle that could potentially bring 
negative consequences in future elections by angering 
either engineer or architect constituents and/or the trade 
associations involved.  Again, the legislature declined to 
take any action on this issue.   
In October of 2009, the District Court reversed the 
actions of the Texas Board of Architectural Examiners 
against the engineers in question but remanded the cases 
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back to the administrative law judge for additional 
hearings.  This action by the District Court Judge was seen 
as “splitting the baby” by both sides of the dispute.  
Discussions with both engineers and architects revealed the 
perception that the judge was influenced by the same 
electoral pressures that resulted in the legislature’s 
refusal to act.  The potential for this dispute to continue 
well into the future at the Third Court of Appeals level 
and eventually the Texas Supreme Court was a great concern 
to the Texas Society of Professional Engineers, again due 
to the uncertainty of judicial process and additional legal 
expenses.   
In the fall of 2010, the Texas Society of Professional 
Engineers developed a legislative strategy for the 82
nd
 
Legislative Session that would use the ongoing lawsuits as 
a way to reframe the issue.  Instead of legislation the 
clarifies the statutory definition of building design, they 
would pursue legislation that prohibited an agency from 
interfering with an individual’s ability to practice their 
profession so long as they were lawfully within their 
practice as defined by their licensing board.  Numerous 
bills were drafted and filed by a variety of legislators 
who were now seemingly more sympathetic to a legislative 
solution due to the lack of clarity and resolve by the 
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courts.  Instead of a scope of practice battle, the issue 
was now framed as undo governmental intrusion that was 
prohibiting individuals from “making a living.”   This new 
approach, exemplifying a reframing strategy by reformers, 
resonated with legislators, and, because of an apparent 
willingness on the part of legislators to intervene, the 
Texas Society of Architects came to the negotiating table 
with the Texas Society of Professional Engineers to attempt 
a compromise solution.  Despite many legislative twists and 
turns, a compromise bill was eventually agreed upon and 
passed in the final days of the 82
nd
 Legislative session.  
Paramount to the bill’s passage was the consensus nature of 
the legislation, quelling legislator concerns of backlash 
in the following election cycle.  After two decades of 
fighting, it appears a solution to this scope of practice 
battle has been achieved. 
In summary, this case study provides evidence that 
reformers utilize interdependent, multi-venue strategies 
over time to advance a policy goal.  The theoretical 







Venues and Strategies Utilized by Reformers in the 
Scope of Practice Battle between Engineers and Architects 
 
Multi-Venue Approach Interdependent Strategies 
Present 
Legislative 
Judicial: State District 
Court 
Quasi-Judicial: State Office 
of Administrative Hearing, 
Attorney General Opinion 
Reframing 
Agenda Setting 
      
 
According to the decision makers for the Texas Society of 
Professional Engineers, the engineering organization 
driving the reform, the strategy related to executing their 
preferred policy outcome included active participation in 
the legislative, judicial, and quasi-judicial arenas in an 
interdependent manner.  The quasi-judicial arena was 
accessed by the use of Attorney General Opinions and the 
State Office of Administrative Hearings, and the judicial 
arena by the district court at various points in time based 
on the opportunity structure that was present.  The 
legislative arena was also utilized in conjunction with and 
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interdependent to the judicial strategy over multiple 
legislative sessions.     
Since the legislature declined to act on the issue 
both 2007 and 2009, the Texas Society of Professional 
Engineers continued to pursue resolution in the court 
system. After the District Court ruling in 2009 that still 
did not provide resolution, and because of the nature of 
the opinion itself, attorneys for the organization conveyed 
their opinion that the likelihood of the case continuing to 
the Third Court of Appeals and eventually the State Supreme 
Court was high and that such a process could take as long 
as 8-10 years.  Desiring to achieve a solution in a more 
timely fashion, the organization again pursued legislative 
reform, this time utilizing activity in the judicial realm 
to reframe the policy issue by focusing on the court 
systems failure to resolve the dispute and the ongoing 
consequences for the individuals involved in the suits.  
This strategy was successful as numerous legislators that 
were not interested in the issue in previous sessions 
became interested in resolving the issue because in their 
opinion swift resolution through the court system was now 
unlikely.
105
  This difference in legislative interest is 
evidenced by the lack of bills filed on the issue in 
                                                 
105 Observation of interaction with legislators, January –March 2011. 
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previous legislative sessions compared to the numerous 
bills filed on the issue during the 82
nd
 Legislative 
Session.  Additionally, in June of 2010, Representatives 
Wayne Smith and Bill Callegari both wrote official letters 
to each licensing board describing their intent to solve 
the issue should the dispute continue due to TSPE’s 
reframing of the issue from a technical interpretation of 
the practice of building design to the right of an 
individual to practice their profession.  Moreover, TSPE 
was able to frame the ongoing activity in the judicial 
arena as a state budget issue; according to House 
Appropriations Committee staffers, budget conscious 
legislators inquired as to the cost to the state of the 
lawsuits involving a state agency against the licensees of 
another agency continuing.
106
  Thus, the utilization of 
outcomes in judicial and quasi-judicial venues to reframe 
the battle from a technical discussion of what constituted 
building design to an issue of right to practice as well as 
a budget concern proved to be successful legislatively; 
resolution was finally achieved in 2011 with the passage of 
HB 2459 that clarified both the engineer’s and architect’s 
practice acts with regard to the issue. 
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This in-depth examination of the scope of practice 
battle between the architects and engineers in Texas 
reveals a highly complex and adaptive strategy by reformers 
in the state policy realm.  Legislative and legal 
institutions were utilized time and again to advance a 
policy agenda by reformers.  Oftentimes, legislative and 
legal strategies were used interdependently, with movement 
in one realm effecting outcomes in the other.  Motivations 
for the utilization of quasi-judicial venues included 
attempts of resolution as well reframing the issue to 
ultimately stimulate resolution. Institutional 
configurations constrain reformer strategy by setting the 
“rules of the game,” but reformers in this example did not 
simply utilize a legal or legislative strategy.  Rather, 
the experience of reformers engaged in this issue suggests 
a much more complex relationship of legislatures and legal 







The previously examined case study regarding a scope of 
practice battle between engineers and architects 
demonstrates the complexity of strategy that two highly 
organized factions utilize in waging a policy war.  
However, this complex strategy can also be seen in an in-
depth examination of transportation infrastructure policy 
reform in Texas.  In contrast to scope of practice type 
issues where two rent-seeking groups are pitted against one 
another, transportation infrastructure policy at the state 
legislative level is traditionally viewed as a public good 
because the legislature does not engage (at least generally 
speaking) in contract awards or the allocation of funds to 
particular projects.  Therefore, reformers involved in this 
policy arena rarely have a defined “opposition.”  According 
to professionals in this area, it is uncommon to find 
opposition to infrastructure in general; rather, you may 
find groups interested in one mode over another, i.e. 
roads, rail, etc., or geographic disputes such as urban 
versus rural or Dallas versus Houston.  Additionally, this 
issue does not tend to be influenced by partisan agendas.  
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As Senator Kirk Watson noted in a speech to the Texas 
Business Leadership Council, there do not seem to be 
Democrat bridges or Republican overpasses.
107
  In framing 
transportation infrastructure as a policy area, “we all 
tend to be for transportation.”
108
   
 And yet, transportation infrastructure policy is not 
without its share of contention.  Modal and geographic 
factions aside, transportation advocates have experienced 
difficulty in advancing an agenda of overall investment.  
Currently, the state of Texas spends approximately $8 
billion annually on the state’s transportation system.   
Despite this large budget, over the past decade Texas has 
experienced a shortfall with regard to transportation 
infrastructure investment due to the state’s growth 
outpacing the existing infrastructure capacity.  This 
funding shortfall is well documented by both academic 
researchers and the Texas Department of Transportation and 
widely accepted by legislators.  Hence, transportation 
advocates have been actively engaged in this issue over the 
past decade.  
Specifically, in 2006, the Texas Governor’s Business 
Council reported in their report, “Shaping the Competitive 
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Advantage of Texas Metropolitan Regions,” that the state 
was facing a $66 billion funding shortfall for identified 
transportation improvements over a 25 year period.
109
  
Failure to adequately fund the state’s transportation 
infrastructure, according to the report, would result in 
decreased economic activity and staggering congestion on 
the state’s roadways.  Subsequent reports were also 
produced, most notably the 2030 committee report 
commissioned by the Texas Department of Transportation.  
According to the 2030 Committee website:  
 
The 2030 Committee was originally formed in May 2008 
by Texas Transportation Commission Chair Deirdre 
Delisi, at the request of Texas Governor Rick Perry. 
This volunteer committee of experienced and respected 
business leaders was initially charged with providing 
an independent, authoritative assessment of the 
state's transportation infrastructure and mobility 
needs from 2009 to 2030.  In July 2010, Chair Delisi 
reconvened the 2030 Committee and charged the panel 
with developing an updated analysis of the current 
state of the Texas transportation system, determining 
the household costs of under-investing in the system 





The 2030 Committee concluded that the state of Texas would 
be required to invest an additional $315 billion over the 
next 20 years in order to adequately meet the state’s 
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mobility needs.  Consequently, public advocacy groups 
involved in transportation around the state began to focus 
on a policy solution for the state’s impending needs.       
In addition to the identified critical funding 
shortfall, the Texas Department of Transportation reported 
that “diversions” from the State Highway Fund, a 
constitutionally dedicated account for motor fuel tax and 
motor vehicle registration fee receipts, were on the rise 
at approximately $1 billion a biennium, representing 
approximately $10 billion in lost revenue for 
transportation since the practice began in the mid 1980’s.  
Article 8, Section 7a of the Texas Constitution states: 
Subject to legislative appropriation, allocation and 
direction, all net revenues remaining after payment of 
all refunds allowed by law and expenses of collection 
derived from motor vehicle registration fees, and all 
taxes, except gross production and ad valorem taxes, 
on motor fuels and lubricants used to propel motor 
vehicles over public roadways, shall be used for the 
sole purpose of acquiring rights-of-way, constructing, 
maintaining, and policing such public roadways, and 
for the administration of such laws as may be 
prescribed by the Legislature pertaining to the 
supervision of traffic and safety on such roads. 
 
Therefore, the state Constitution requires that all revenue 
from the motor fuel tax and motor vehicle registration fees 
be used for specifically enumerated transportation 
purposes, but there was growing concern among 
transportation advocates that the Texas Legislature was not 
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abiding by this constitutional provision, thus making 
funding matters worse.  In a May 2009 Policy Brief, the 
Texas Public Policy Foundation writes:  
These are funds that could have been used to pave new 
roads, ease traffic congestion, improve transportation 
infrastructure, etc.  Instead, these tax dollars are 
going to supplement the budgets of the Historical 
Commission, the Commission on the Arts, and the Texas 





Additionally, veteran political journalist Paul Burka 
described the diversion practice in a 2010 blog: 
 
Those who call for ending the diversions conveniently 
overlook that the problem is not the diversions; it’s 
why we have to divert, which is that the state’s 
revenue stream is inadequate to fund the services that 
the state provides. Sure, we ought to end the practice 
of diverting gasoline tax revenue to fund DPS. That 
$1,234,108,574 would buy a lot of concrete. But the 
moment that you end the diversion to DPS, you are 






In summary, not only had the state of Texas identified a 
critical shortfall with regard to transportation 
infrastructure funding, but also monies currently collected 
to fund transportation were being diverted from their 
constitutionally dedicated purpose to plug other holes in 
the state budget.  In response, public advocacy groups 
                                                 
111 Texas Public Policy Foundation, Policy Brief, May 2009. 
112 Burka, Paul. “The Gasoline Tax Diversions.” The Burka Blog; Texas 
Monthly, December 5, 2010. 
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related to transportation began to coalesce in order to 
advance a policy solution for what they believed to be of 
critical importance to the state’s long term economic 
vitality.        
In 2007, the Texas Urban Transportation Alliance along 
with other public interest groups such as the Gulf Coast 
Regional Mobility Partners, Dallas Regional Mobility 
Coalition, Tarrant Regional Transportation Coalition, and 
the San Antonio Mobility Coalition, attempted to 
legislatively correct the practice of diversions and push 
for additional transportation infrastructure funding.  The 
membership of these groups mainly consisted of private 
businesses, private citizens, chambers of commerce, and 
some local governmental entities.    
At this time, issues related to transportation 
infrastructure were not viewed as partisan in nature, but 
factions did exist, although not divided along party lines, 
as to the appropriate method for enhancing infrastructure 
investment specifically around the issue of private sector 
investment in toll road development and the increased use 
of debt by the state.  While numerous bills were filed 
related to the transportation issue and the various 
controversial issues listed above that divided the 
transportation advocate community, reformers were able to 
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coalesce around the diversion issue in support of HB 3713  
which was captioned “Relating to Permissible Uses of the 
State Highway Fund.”  This bill limited the use of the 
State Highway Fund as follows:    
 
Sec. 222.0025.  LIMITATION ON USE OF STATE HIGHWAY 
FUND.  Notwithstanding any other law, money in the 
state highway fund that is described by Section 
222.001 or 222.002 may not be transferred to or 
appropriated for use by: 
(1)  the Department of Public Safety; 
(2)  the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; 
(3)  the Texas Transportation Institute; 
(4)  the Department of State Health Services; 
(5)  the Department of Aging and Disability Services; 
(6)  the Department of Assistive and Rehabilitative 
Services; 
(7)  the Department of Family and Protective Services; 
(8)  the Health and Human Services Commission or any 
other health and human services agency or entity; 
(9)  the Texas Historical Commission; 
(10)  the Texas Commission on the Arts; 
(11)  the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board; 
(12)  the Texas Education Agency; or 
(13)  the Texas Workforce Commission.
113
 
    
 
This bill, along with two other bills on the same subject 
were filed, but did not receive committee hearings, 
amounting to the pigeonholing of the issue. Additionally, 
Senator Carona filed SB 165, which would index the rate of 
the state gasoline and diesel fuel taxes to the Highway 
Cost Index.  Interestingly, SB 165 also did not receive a 
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committee hearing, despite the fact that Senator Carona was 
the Chairman of the committee to which his bill was 
referred.  This type of legislative activity i.e. bills 
filed without subsequent hearings, according to veteran 
transportation reformer Blanca Laborde, indicates that 
while reformers were able to garner a moderate amount of 
legislative attention in getting their desired reforms 
filed in the form of bills, that the issue was extremely 
low on both the bill author’s personal legislative agenda 
as well as the legislature’s agenda as a whole.  While 
reformers focused their attention on the 80
th
 Legislative 
Session, the legislature did not take significant action on 
either ending diversions or increased infrastructure 
funding.     
 After the legislative session, the Texas Urban 
Transportation Alliance (TUTA) contemplated pursuing an 
Attorney General’s opinion related to the legislature’s use 
of the State Highway Fund for non-transportation purposes.  
According a former TUTA Board member, this particular 
action was contemplated due to the lack of traction that 
advocates experienced legislatively and receiving a 
favorable AG opinion might force the legislature to move 
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the issue up on their agenda.
114
  Therefore, TUTA leaders 
identified an agenda setting purpose for engaging in a 
judicial-like reform strategy.  The strategy was not to 
look for the Attorney General to end diversions, but rather 
for the issuance of an Attorney General Opinion that could 
motivate the legislature to act.  While funding per se was 
not viewed as an issue that would be a good fit for 
judicial or quasi-judicial interventions based upon the 
institutional opportunity structure, the use of 
constitutionally dedicated funds outside of 
constitutionally stated purposes did pose an interesting 
question that might be a good fit for a quasi-judicial 
venue, an Attorney General opinion.  Additionally, the TUTA 
board consisted of three county judges, constitutionally 
authorized Attorney General Opinion requestors making this 
judicial-like venue easily accessible.  Once the Attorney 
General Opinion request was drafted, however, the TUTA 
board and transportation advocates declined to pursue this 
venue of reform.       
How did advocates evaluate the strategic decision of 
whether or not to pursue an Attorney General opinion in 
this instance?  Interviews with TUTA leadership about the 
decision making process and the strategy of reform reveal 
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the following: first, reformers do not consider potential 
avenues of reform in a vacuum; rather, they evaluate 
opportunity structures based upon institutional and 
political constraints.  Reformers had to consider the 
repercussions of a perceived victory in this quasi-judicial 
arena to potential legislative outcomes.  While they had no 
conversations with legislators to this effect, a 
conservative strategic analysis would have to take into 
account the possibility that even a favorable AG opinion 
which would require the entirety of the State Highway Fund 
to be appropriated to transportation purposes might cause a 
reduction in transportation funding from other sources.  
Therefore, in this case the relationship between venues 
regarding both strategy and outcome were evaluated 
interdependently.  Reformers also evaluated how this type 
of request would be perceived by legislators i.e. 
challenging powerful appropriators on their methods of 
allocating billions of dollars of state money was not an 
attractive position.  In evaluating this strategy, 
reformers had to weigh the benefits of agenda setting, 
their primary objective from seeking an Attorney General 
Opinion, with the potential for legislative backlash in 
other funding sources, thus demonstrating the 
interdependent nature of a multi-venue approach.   
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Secondarily, reformers had to account for the fact 
that the Attorney General also does not operate in a vacuum 
and is subject to opportunity structures as well.  How 
might the Attorney General rule in this manner and what 
would be the ramifications to the Attorney General of 
ruling against this legislative practice?  Would the 
legislature abide by this type of ruling?  If not, what 
would be the incentive for the Attorney General to rule in 
the favor of transportation advocates?  As previously 
discussed in the engineers versus architects case study, 
sophisticated reformers prefer to ask questions when they 
have a fair amount of certainty in what the answer will be 
with regard to AG opinions.  The high degree of uncertainty  
surrounding this venue of reform, albeit at first glance an 
easily accessible venue of reform for transportation 
reformers, influenced the ultimate strategy of not to move 
forward with seeking an Attorney General Opinion at that 
point in  time.  Despite fervent support of the issue, 
highly strategic and interdependent thinking about the 
interaction of the legislature and quasi-judicial venues of 
reform produced a cost benefit analysis that supported 
inaction in this realm.   
In summary, through interviews and participant 
observation in the decision making process of TUTA, a cost 
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benefit analysis of the decision to engage the Attorney 
General is revealed. Reformers considered the potential 
positive outcome of succeeding in utilizing this venue to 
agenda set their issue legislatively versus the potential 
negative outcomes of losing their moral high ground on the 
legality of the issue or creating additional adversarial 
legislative relationships.  Thus, the decision to be in-
active in this venue was indeed highly strategic.        
  The decision to be inactive in the quasi-judicial 
realm caused transportation advocates to focus heavily on 
traditional legislative-based reform.  The same previously 
identified coalition of groups continued to push for 
additional funding during the 81
st
 Legislative Session and 
similar bills were filed as in the past session regarding 
the ending of diversions and indexing the motor fuels tax 
to inflation.  However, transportation reformers also 
pushed for additional legislation on the issue. 
Specifically, an alliance lead by the Tarrant Regional 
Transportation Coalition (TRTC) began a push for local 
option legislation that would empower local governmental 
entities to levy voter approved fees for transportation 
infrastructure improvements. In order to accomplish this 
goal, TRTC engaged the high profile lobbying firm, HillCo 
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Parnters.  According to a February 15, 2009 Fort Worth Star 
Telegram article quoting HillCo founder Bill Miller:       
 
The company’s (HillCo) lobbyists are working en masse 
to pass the legislation, he said, adding that HillCo 
is engaged in the most comprehensive deployment of 
"manpower and womanpower" since he co-founded the firm 
more than a decade ago. 
"I’ve seen more HillCo people at these meetings than 
any other deal I’ve done," Miller said. "We have a big 
pool of talent, and we’re deploying it as fast and 
furiously as we can." 
Although elected officials also participate in the 
effort and make contact with lawmakers, Miller said, 
HillCo is "quarterbacking the play" and directing 
strategy. 
"We have to persuade people to support it, to find 
ways to make it attractive to them," he said. "Or to 
persuade them that their opposition is unwarranted. 




Interestingly, what began as a described “classic lobby 
deal” by the lobbyist involved on the local option 
legislation in February turned in to an all out legislative 
battle in the spring of 2009.  The “TLOTA” legislation, 
because of the high profile lobby effort, caught the 
attention of numerous partisan and grassroots 
organizations, a turn that the transportation advocates did 
not anticipate due to the relatively low degree of 
political salience the issue had experienced in the past.  
The “TLOTA” bill, muscled through the Senate by Senate 
Transportation and Homeland Security Chairman John Carona, 
                                                 
115 Montgomery, Dave. Fort Worth Star Telegram, February 15, 2009.  
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eventually died during the last days of the legislative 
session in the House of Representatives.  Reformers 
actively working on this issue report that the bill did not 
make an important calendar deadline due to Republican House 
members not wanting to take a vote on the issue fearing 
that it would be perceived by grassroots organizations as 
vote for more taxes.  Vic Suhm, Executive Director for the 
Tarrant Regional Transportation Coalition, describes the 
events:         
Part of the reluctance of House members of course 
stems from the crusade put on by the Texas Public 
Policy Foundation, Empower Texans, Americans for 
Prosperity, and the Republican Party of Texas, the 
Chair of which actually stood in the lobby, called 
members out of the House chamber and threatened them 
if they voted for local option.  This coupled with a 
grass roots effort to generate phone calls, e-mails, 
and faxes to members urging them to vote against local 
option certainly made it harder for House members to 






Organizations that did not support the bill were successful 
in framing the issue as a broad tax-hike despite the 
provisions that required voter approval similar to other 
infrastructure bond elections.  The Republican Party base 
became both energized and mobilized to the point that the 
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significant lobby muscle employed to pass the bill was 
unable to overcome the opposition.   
 According to Vic Suhm, Executive Director of TRTC and 
leader of the TLOTA lobby effort, it was decided by 
transportation advocates not to pursue additional “TLOTA” 
legislation in the 82
nd
 Legislative session because of the 
Tea Party success in the 2010 election cycle.
117
  Instead, 
their new focus became changing the collective mind of the 
Republican primary base and/or reframing the issue centered 
on the “cost of doing nothing.”
118
  According to polling 
data, the process has been slow to garner significant 
levels public support.  In Suhm’s view, until that base of 
voters supports additional infrastructure investment, it is 
unlikely that reform will be achieved.  With both the 
legislative and judicial avenues of reform stymied, 
transportation advocates have retreated to grass roots 
messaging efforts.  This type of approach is considered to 
be very expensive and difficult, but advocates of this 
issue feel that it is really the only avenue of reform 
available at this time. 
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In summary, this case study also provides evidence 
that reformers utilize interdependent, multi-venue 
strategies over time to advance a policy goal.  The 
theoretical tenants present in the transportation case 
study are as follows: 
Figure 4 
Venues and Strategies Utilized by Reformers Engaged in 
Transportation Infrastructure Funding Reform 
 








This examination of the experience of transportation 
advocates demonstrates how reformers evaluate legislative 
and judicial arenas interdependently to advance a policy 
goal.  While those involved in the engineer-architect scope 
of practice battle were ultimately successful in achieving 
a desired policy outcome, transportation advocates have yet 
to achieve their goals of ending diversions from the State 
Highway Fund and increasing infrastructure funding in 
general.  Because of the opportunity structure in place for 
accessing the judicial system and/or quasi-judicial venues 
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of reform, those involved in the engineer/architect dispute 
were able to use a variety of entry points and strategies 
that were quasi-judicial in nature. Transportation 
advocates, on the other hand, perceive the Office of the 
Attorney General to be their only viable point of access at 
this time based upon the opportunity structure related to 
the issue itself.  Should the cost benefit analysis to 
pursue change in the legal realm yield a different result 
or unforeseen opportunities arise to further engage in 
quasi-judicial strategies in this policy arena, 
transportation advocates indicate that they will 
aggressively pursue this course.   
The experience of transportation advocates shows that 
public interest groups as well as rent seeking groups 
utilize highly strategic approaches in evaluating when and 
importantly when not to use a particular venue of reform 
and that legislative and judicial venues are not viewed as 
insulated branches but rather as complimentary avenues of 
achieving a particular policy goal.  This case provides a 
good example of the decision to not engage in quasi-
judicial reform despite the relative ease in which that 
venue was available through the use of an Attorney General 
Opinion, thus providing greater insight as to how reformers 
evaluate how and when to utilize such venues.       
 132 
Despite the fact that the particulars of the desired 
reform involve technical aspects of the state budgeting 
process and a sophisticated understanding of state 
accounting, the transportation infrastructure case study 
can be categorized as moderately politically salient due to 
the fact that grassroots organizations and the Tea Party 
grabbed a hold of the issue.  Thus, the in-depth 
examination of both the engineers and architects scope of 
practice case study and the transportation infrastructure 
case study demonstrate how reformers think about the 
utilization of courts and judicial-like venues alongside 
the legislative process even given that the nature of the 
issues themselves varies according to their political 
salience.  Furthermore, the experience of transportation 
advocated suggests that despite the use of a sophisticated 
interdependent, multi-venue approach, limitations do exist 
on reformers abilities to produce their desired change.   
Next I will examine the highly publicized and polarized 







The previously examined issues of the engineer/architect 
scope of practice battle and transportation infrastructure 
funding show the use of complex, interdependent strategy in 
venue selection throughout the policy reform process.  
Reformers in both case studies continued to evaluate the 
use of the legislature in conjunction with the use of 
judicial and quasi-judicial strategies as they progressed 
in their respective policy reform movements.  The 
engineer/architect case study highlighted strategy in the 
context of two highly specialized and organized professions 
in a fairly technical policy arena.  Reformers first sought 
to resolve the issue through the use of quasi-judicial 
institutions.  This approach was not successful, but 
reformers were eventually able to utilize quasi-judicial 
and judicial venues to reframe the issue and ultimately 
spur legislative action.  The transportation infrastructure 
case study examined the use of strategy in the context of 
public interest groups advancing policy on what they 
believe to be a public good in a moderately politically 
salient context.  In this case, reformers ultimately 
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decided against utilizing a quasi-judicial venue because 
they perceived that a victory in that arena had the 
potential to undermine their overall policy objective.  Do 
the complexity of strategy and the use of the legislative 
and judicial venues interdependently also apply in a highly 
politically salient context where policy is defined along 
partisan lines?  We will examine the use of reform strategy 
in this context through an in-depth discussion of the issue 
of voter ID.     
 The issue of voter ID has been at the forefront of 
partisan politics in Texas for almost a decade.  The issue 
is on its face a simple matter of showing one’s photo 
identification to vote, much like other everyday activities 
that require a verification of identity such a using a 
credit card.  Underneath that surface, however, lies a 
political hotbed of issues related to race, poverty, and 
corruption.   
First proposed legislatively by Republicans in 2005, 
the issue of voter ID has consumed a great deal of both 
time and political capital in Texas politics.  Democrats in 
Texas argued that voter ID legislation would disenfranchise 
poor and minority voters who traditionally vote Democratic. 
On the other hand, Republicans in Texas argued that voter 
ID legislation was needed to prevent voter fraud. Although 
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outnumbered in the Legislature, Democrats succeeded in 
blocking voter ID bills for three straight sessions. 
However, the results of the 2010 state legislative 
elections in Texas surprised even the staunchest Republican 
insiders.  Most political analysts predicted that 
Republicans would pick up between 8 and 10 seats in the 
state House of Representatives in which Republicans 
previously held slim 76 to 73 majority.  No one predicted 
the landslide Republican victory that created a 101 
Republican super-majority, an opportunity that was not lost 
on reformers whose goals aligned with the party in power.   
With Republicans holding a two-thirds majority in the 
state House of Representatives and the Governor designating 
voter ID as emergency legislation that could be acted on 
within the first 60 days of the legislative session, 
Democrats simply would not be able to procedurally block 
the legislation in the 2011 session.   
While this reform had been attempted and failed in 
previous session, the manner in which the legislation was 
defeated in the 2009 legislative session intensified the 
desire on the part of reformers and the Republican Party to 
achieve success in 2011, a type of payback for the 
derailing of numerous Republican legislators’ legislative 
packages through the running out of the constitutionally 
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dictated legislative clock for passing bills. According to 
the rules of the Texas House of Representatives, bills 
generally must be taken up in the order that they appear on 
the House calendar.  Bills are placed in order on the House 
calendar by the powerful Calendars committee normally 
chaired by the party in power.  Thus, the party in power 
ultimately decides which bills come up for a vote on the 
House floor.  With a little over a week to spare in the 
2009 legislative session, the Republican-led House, and 
specifically the Calendars Committee, placed the voter ID 
bill on the calendar and prepared for lengthy debate and 
resistance lead by Democrats, but also knew that they had 
the votes to ultimately get it passed.  But Democrats did 
not give in easily and crafted a plan that would run out 
the clock on the legislative session because of the number 
of bills that preceded the voter ID bill on the calendar.  
Utilizing the House rules to their advantage, the Democrats 
began to “chub” bills that appeared before the voter ID 
bill on the calendar in a similar fashion to a rotating 
filibuster.  The Texas Tribune explains the process of 
“chubbing:”   
The long-winded House counterpart to filibustering is 
known as "chubbing." To chub a bill, representatives 
extend their conversations on legislation that's 
closer to the front of the line, wasting time and 
slowly closing the window of opportunity to vote on 
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the bill they don't like. The term "chubbing" first 
appeared in Texas newspapers in the 1950s, according 
to the Legislative Reference Library, and the Oxford 
Dictionary of American Political Slang cites the term 
as uniquely Texan in origin, but provides no insight 
on its etymology...The Texas House has time limits. A 
representative has 10 minutes to speak but can go 
longer if a majority approves. If the majority wants 
to get things moving, the minority has to find another 
way to slow progress. They chub, using the full 10 
minutes on each piece of legislation in front of their 
target, delaying consideration until the majority 




Despite around the clock and through the weekend debate, 
Democrats were able to run out the legislative clock, but 
in doing so they not only successfully blocked the voter ID 
bill, but hundreds of other pieces of legislation that were 
behind the voter ID bill on the calendar.  Some Republicans 
saw their entire legislative packages derailed as well as 
“must pass” legislation related to continuation of 
important state agencies such as the Texas Department of 
Transportation and the Texas Department of Insurance.  
Democrats loudly declared victory. 
 The “chub-a-thon” staged by Democrats in 2009 produced 
a visceral environment between Democrats and Republicans on 
the voter ID issue in 2011.  From the beginning of the 
legislative session, Republicans began a systematic affront 
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on any procedural tactics that Democrats might be able to 
use to stop the legislation.  First, Republican Governor 
Rick Perry designated voter ID as an “emergency” 
legislative item at the beginning of the 2011 session.  
From a procedural standpoint, emergency legislation can be 
considered by each chamber of the Legislature before the 
60
th
 day of the legislative session.  By addressing the 
issue early in the legislative calendar, in this case 
before what would prove to be a difficult and controversial 
budget cycle, the chances that the voter ID legislation 
would be held hostage by Democrats would be diminished.  
Next, the state Senate presided over by Republican 
Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst, who watched their 
legislative packages die on the House side during the 2009 
Democratic torpedoing of legislating calendar,  suspended 
the 2/3 rule in the state Senate which requires that bills 
in the chamber have the approval of 2/3 of senators in 
order to be debated.  Since rules are adopted by a majority 
vote at the beginning of the legislative session, Senate 
Republicans exempted the voter ID issue from the 2/3 rule, 
running over attempts by Democrats to again block the 
legislation.  The ability to act on legislation within the 
first 60 days of the legislative session combined with only 
needing a simple majority to vote on the issue in the 
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Senate insured little legislative recourse for Democrats 
opposing the bill.    
After the suspension of the 2/3 rule, Senator Juan 
“Chuy” Hinojosa, a Democrat from the Rio Grande valley, 
gave an interview to the Texas Tribune in which he is 
quoted, “We (Democrats) are not just going to roll over and 
play dead.  Now our work is to set parameters for the 
possible challenge in federal court.”
120
  This public 
declaration of strategy is important to our investigation 
as it demonstrates how both venues are utilized 
interdependently.  Notice that he did not say that “our 
work” is to challenge to the legislation in court after the 
legislative session, but to set parameters for the upcoming 
court challenge.  At first glance, one might conclude that 
a federal court challenge supports the litigation strategy 
literature that argues that judicial venues are utilized as 
a last resort strategy.  While that is partly true, a 
closer look reveals the perceived interdependence on the 
part of reformers of the legislative and judicial branches.     
 According to reformers involved in the issue, witness 
testimony on SB 14, the voter ID bill, was lengthy and 
highly strategic.  Those in support of the bill framed 
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testimony in an effort to build the case that voter fraud 
is a problem that must be addressed while those against the 
bill framed testimony as to the discrimination and hardship 
such legislation would cause, particularly on minority 
populations.   Journalists covering the hearings described 
the testimony as a legal record – not testimony on the 
merits of legislation in order to persuade legislators how 
to vote on the issue as committee testimony is 
traditionally conceived but as a record to be used in the 
building of offensive and defensive litigation strategy.  
Ross Ramsay of the Texas Tribune reported: 
Democrats are left to build a legal record, getting 
expert and nonexpert witnesses to testify (Republicans 
are doing the same) for the inevitable court fight 
ahead.  Both sides are dug in, and dug in on partisan 
lines. And the issue is arguably more about politics 
than about policy, anyway, a proxy for other wars 
about party politics, about immigration and 





 Democrats and Republicans in the state House dug in as 
well.  Recalling the 2009 debacle, House Republicans showed 
no quarter.  A newspaper article describes the event: 
After more than 11 hours of debate, seven points of 
order, more than 60 amendments and nearly as many 
heated exchanges, a mentally vanquished and 
emotionally exhausted Texas House preliminarily 
approved the controversial voter ID bill late tonight. 
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They (Democrats) tried — and failed — time and again 
through amendments to loosen the strict voting 
requirements. 
 
State Rep. Patricia Harless, R-Spring, the bill’s 
House sponsor, bore the brunt of the Democrats’ 
frustrations. But she and Republican supporters of the 
measure dug in, and rejected even moderate proposals 
for change. With Republicans accounting for 101 of the 






As SB 14 made its way the Governor’s desk, Republican 
reformers finally got the victory they had been seeking on 
the issue.  
 However, Senator Hinojosa’s description of the 
Democrats’ game plan was well underway.  Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act gives the federal government the 
authority to review state laws that affect voter 
participation.  In a statement to the Justice Department, a 
coalition of reform groups submitted arguments that the law 
is meant to disenfranchise minorities.     
The coalition argues that the bill unfairly targets 
minority and elderly voters, echoing the argument 
Texas Democratic lawmakers made during the debate over 
the bill at the Capitol. “This will adversely and 
disproportionately affect citizens of color who do not 
have the financial wherewithal as their White 
counterparts to secure the documentation necessary to 
meet the Act’s strict requirement,” states a letter 
submitted as public comment by the Advancement 
Project, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Asian 
American Justice Center and the Southwest Workers 
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Union. The groups wrote that instead of actually 
providing proof the legislation was enacted for non-
discriminatory reasons, the state relied simply on its 
claim that officials did not intend on diluting the 





Interestingly, the coalition’s argument is based largely on 
the framing of witness testimony during the legislative 
process, indicating that the testimony provided during 
public hearings held on potential legislation during the 
legislative process were part of their overall judicial 
strategy, evidence of an interdependent, multi-venue 
approach in a highly politically salient context.   
In a separate proceeding, the state filed a lawsuit 
seeking preclearance in the D.C. District Court in January, 
2012 in order to apply the provisions of SB 14 in the 2012 
election cycle.  Both sides of the dispute utilized bill 
analyses, witness testimony, committee hearings, floor 
debate, and other legislative material to frame their 
arguments regarding the legislation as evidenced by the 
supplemental documentation that they provided to the court. 
On August 30, 2012, the federal court issued its 
ruling in Texas v Holder, finding SB 14 violates Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act. This ruling meant that Texas 
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could not enforce SB 14 in the 2012 November elections.  
The ruling states:  
Uncontested record evidence conclusively shows that 
the implicit costs of obtaining SB 14-qualifying ID 
will fall most heavily on the poor and that a 
disproportionately high percentage of African 
Americans and Hispanics in Texas who live in poverty… 
We therefore conclude that SB 14 is likely to lead to 
retrogression in the position of racial minorities 





Despite the Texas v Holder ruling, the voter ID debate 
continues.  Attorney General of Texas Greg Abbott has 
claimed that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is 
unconstitutional and at the time of this writing is 
contemplating pursuing action by the United State Supreme 
Court pending Court action on similar voting rights cases.     
The case study of voter ID is a good example of a 
highly partisan policy reform in Texas.  The issue of voter 
ID was portrayed as a litmus test for the primary voter in 
both the Republican and Democratic parties and was widely 
discussed along the campaign trail. Reformers seeking to 
advance voter ID policy reform attempted legislative change 
several times before they achieved their policy goals.  
Interestingly, reformers pushing this issue did not seek 
reform in the court system after their initial legislative 
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attempts were unsuccessful like the cases of transportation 
finance or the engineers versus architects’ scope of 
practice battle.  Unlike cases where the legislature chose 
not take action, in the case of voter ID, the Republican 
majority attempted to take action but was ultimately 
defeated by parliamentary maneuvering.  Each time reformers 
approached the legislature on this issue, they expected to 
win because it was a partisan issue and the issue was in 
line with the sentiment of the dominant party.  
According to reformers, their analysis of the 
alignment of the issue with the goals of the Republican 
Party led them to choose a legislative strategy each time.  
And each time they believed they would win.  Reformers 
engaged in supporting voter ID legislation reported that an 
initial judicial strategy had been considered as an avenue 
of reform and that they expected the issue would be 
challenged in the judicial arena by the opposition.  
Specifically, they chose the legislative arena as opposed 
to the judicial arena because of institutional limitations 
of accessing the court system.  Cases relating to voter 
fraud could conceivably access the state judicial arena and 
had been contemplated, but by their evaluation would be 
more difficult to pursue and they would ultimately have 
less control over the outcome.   
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 However, the decision of reformers in favor of voter 
ID not to utilize a judicial reform strategy does not mean 
that a multi-venue approach was not present in this case.  
A close look at the voter ID case reveals that reformers 
who worked in opposition to the voter ID bill were not 
optimistic that the tactics that had worked in past 
legislative sessions to block the legislation would be 
successful in 2011.  Therefore, their plan shifted to the 
utilization of the legislative process for reframing their 
judicial strategy.  Reformers in the minority political 
position with regard to voter ID assessed their odds of 
success based on the partisan make up of the state 
political context and concluded that the federal court 
system would be a less adversarial playing ground not 
because they perceived it to be less political necessarily, 
but that it was at least different than the partisan 
context in Texas.  Opportunity structures related to the 
issue itself allowed them to easily transcend the state 
political context and reformers wasted no time after the 
bill became law to move their issue in to that realm. 
The voter ID case study provides good insight into 
reform strategy in a highly politically salient context.  
Despite Republican legislative majorities, Democrats were 
successful in blocking voter ID legislation session after 
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session.  Their defeat of the legislation in the 2009 
legislative session through “chubbing” in the state House 
set the stage for an intensely partisan environment in the 
2011 legislative session where the normal “rules of the 
game” were suspended and the legislation was passed through 
what was called by insiders as a “Republican juggernaut.” 
The legislative process, however, was not wasted by either 
party.  Reformers on both sides viewed the traditional 
legislative steps of witness testimony, committee hearings, 
and floor debate as instrumental in framing a future 
judicial strategy rather than to the actual passage of the 
bill. 
Additionally, this case study reveals interesting 
nuances regarding the juxtaposition of the federal court 
system on the state political context and the perceived 
institutional constraints the judiciary as a venue of 
reform.  Related to the identified institutional 
constraints, reformers again saw an issue’s access to the 
court system as more complicated as compared to a more open 
legislative process where almost any issue can be on the 
table.  Secondly, reformers perceived lack of control over 
the outcome was a disincentive to seek reform through 
employing a judicial strategy.  Third, reformers in this 
context were unable to access other quasi-judicial 
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strategies such as Attorney General opinions or the State 
Office of Administrative Hearings due to the opportunity 
structure of those institutions and the nature of the voter 
ID issues; such venues were not a good fit because neither 
had adequate oversight over this issue to be a viable 
strategy.   
Additionally, the effect of the federal court system 
on the state political system is also highlighted in this 
case study.  The extent to which a federal court could 
block a legislative “Republican juggernaut” at the state 
level is an important nuance to the public law literature 
and how we understand the strategy of reform.  The desire 
of the reformers in the political minority to seek refuge 
in the federal court system lends credence to the age-old 
conception of the United States Supreme Court as a 
protector of minority rights.  While numerous scholars have 
challenged this notion, it may be that we need to examine 
concept of political minority in the state political 
context and how that concept transcends that context into 
the federal system.  A political minority in the state 
political context may be a majority in the federal context.  
As demonstrated by the voter ID case study, the ability of 
a federal court to overturn a majority favored policy 
outcome at the state level creates additional layers to the 
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counter-majoritarian debates in the public law literature, 
particularly if the state’s policy is in the minority 
position at the federal level.  Additionally, the 
understanding of the state legislative process as a 
foundation for future court action is also a valuable 
distinction within the public law literature.  In this 
sense, venues of reform are not separate and distinct 
tracts but fluid and overlapping tools to advance a policy 
goal. 
In summary, the voter ID case study also provides 
evidence that reformers utilize interdependent, multi-venue 
strategies over time to advance a policy goal in a highly 
politically salient environment.  The theoretical tenants 
present in the voter ID case study are as follows: 
Figure 5 
Venues and Strategies Utilized by Reformers Engaged in 
the Issue of Voter ID 
 
Multi-Venue Approach Interdependent Strategies 
Present 
Legislative 
Judicial: Federal Court 
Reframing 
Venue of Last Resort 
 
 
The voter ID case study supports the notion that reformers 
view legislative and judicial venues of reform as 
interdependent rather than separate and distinct.  In the 
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scope of practice battle between the engineers and 
architects case study as well as the transportation 
infrastructure case study, we see how reformers utilize 
judicial and judicial-like reform venues to stimulate 
legislative activity through instances of reframing and  
agenda setting, and even as last resort.  The voter ID case 
study, on the other hand, shows the utilization of the 
legislative process to stimulate and “set parameters” for 
future court action.  Therefore, it is not a one-
directional relationship in that judicial and quasi-
judicial venues are utilized to shape legislative activity.  
Legislative activity, as demonstrated by the voter ID case, 
is also used by reformers to shape judicial proceedings.  
Taken together, these in-depth case studies reveal that 
reformers do not approach venues as isolated institutions, 
but rather perceive a strategic interdependence in the 










The primary focus of this study has been the strategy that 
reformers employ when seeking public policy change in order 
to better understand the role of courts in policy reform.  
The nature of the judicial system and its ability to affect 
policy change has been a central theme in public law 
literature from both a practical and normative perspective.  
While numerous scholars have studied issues related to 
court capacity and impact related to social policy reform 
from the federal perspective with regard to the US case, 
the literature is not fully developed from the state 
perspective.   
I hypothesized that varying opportunity structures 
shape reformers decisions about when, how, and why to 
utilize a court as a means to shape/make social policy.  
Additionally, I hypothesized that reformers in the field 
utilize institutions as a means to advance their policy 
goals as part of an overall strategy to accomplish an 
objective, rather than as ends that delivers a specific 
outcome.  These questions contemplate courts in the policy 
making arena more broadly than courts themselves; rather, 
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court based strategies can and do encompass other quasi-
judicial institutions available to reformers to advance 
their policy objectives. Constrained by the overall 
opportunity structures available, reformers choose a set of 
strategies that utilize available venues in ways that 
strengthen each other, so that the strategies are not just 
alternative or sequential but interdependent.  Based upon 
volumes of public law scholarship that tells us that courts 
are not very good at achieving standalone reform, 
sophisticated reformers utilize this interdependent, multi-
venue approach in order to maximize their likelihood of 
success.     
Building upon the social movement literature which 
develops the concept of opportunity structures, I contend 
that opportunity structures as applied to reform strategy 
are both intuitionally and politically defined.  
Institutional constraints with regard to opportunities to 
engage in a particular venue vary and professionalized 
reformers are aware of the rules associated with barriers 
to entry for the menu of potential venues that the 
underlying separation of powers structure dictates.  
Additionally, opportunity structures, in the US case, are 
also influenced by federalism.  My examination of a state 
context sheds light on the opportunity structure assessment 
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of reformers related to their goals and the variation 
institutional and political contexts between a state and 
the federal system.  Finally, opportunity structures are 
also politically informed.  By varying case studies in this 
project by political salience, we are able to examine 
evidence of interdependent, multi-venue reform strategies 
along this spectrum.     
 Once opportunity structures have been assessed, 
reformers craft a multi-venue strategy that contemplates 
the utilization of legislative, judicial, and quasi-
judicial venues. Reformers utilize these venues in an 
interdependent manner, that is incremental movement in one 
venue is purposefully meant to create action in another 
venue. As such, venues may be utilized to achieve smaller 
objectives on the path to the desired end.  To restate, a 
multi-venue approach logically entails various desired 
outcomes other than simply achieving the end policy 
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An in-depth examination of the case studies in this project 
reveals an additional richness in the understanding of the 
court’s role in policy reform.  Because reform strategy is 
not utilized in a vacuum, we see reformers in the examined 
case studies using the legislative process in conjunction 
with the judicial process in order to achieve a desired 
outcome.  Therefore, the findings of this research reveal 
valuable nuances to the way we understand the strategic 
interaction of the legislature and judiciary and how 
reformers utilize these venues hand in hand.  Reformers do 
not seem to simply put forward a one-dimensional strategy 
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of reform of either the legislature or the court.  It is 
more accurate to discuss the nature of reform strategy, 
then, as the legislature and the courts.  Framed in this 
light, the question becomes not which venue of reform but 
how can the interaction between these two branches be 
utilized to advance a policy goal.  The state court can be 
a catalyst of legislative reform or stymie attempts of 
reform, even legislatively speaking, depending on reform 
strategy. Conversely, the state legislative process can be 
utilized as a building block for future court battles 
creating dual purposes for the traditionally legislative 
steps of bill analyses and witness testimony.       
Secondarily, the in-depth investigation of reform 
strategy in the state context adds to our understanding of 
courts and their role in policy reform as it relates to 
federalism as an opportunity structure. The juxtaposition 
of the federal court on the state political dynamic with 
regard to public policy reform is an important nuance to 
the public law literature and how we understand the 
strategy of reform.  The desire of the reformers within a 
state political system to seek refuge in the federal court 
system lends credence to the age-old conception of the 
United States Supreme Court as a protector of minority 
rights.  While numerous scholars have challenged this 
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notion, it may be that we need to examine the concept of 
political minority in the state political context and how 
that concept transcends a state context into the federal 
system because a political minority in the state political 
context may be a majority in the federal context.  As 
demonstrated by the voter ID case study, the ability of a 
federal court to overturn a majority favored policy outcome 
at the state level creates additional layers to the 
counter-majoritarian debates in the public law literature, 
particularly if the state’s policy is in the minority 
position at the federal level.  As reformers work to remove 
highly partisan issues from the state to the federal 
environment, they are assessing the political dynamics of 
the state versus federal political schemes, as they are not 
one in the same.  When political scientists are discussing 
the normative implications of the counter-majoritarian 
dilemma, these discussions are typically limited to the 
political makeup of either Congress or the country at 
large.  More thought should be given to the concept of 
counter-majoritarianism at the federal level with regard to 
state politics.  As revealed through examination of the 
voter ID case in Texas, a Republican tidal wave at the 
state level is subject to a potentially Democratic majority 
at the federal level.  Scholars interested in normative 
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aspects of the United States court system could gain 
further insight through the examination of the 
juxtaposition of the federal political environment on to 
individual state environments. 
Keeping in mind that the reform process is iterative 
and the real world is complex, reformers formulate strategy 
and utilize both the courts and the legislature jointly, 
but in different manners based on the nature of the issue, 
to execute their plan and achieve their desired outcomes.  
In the case of the scope of practice battle between the 
engineers and architects, reformers were able to use the 
lack of decisive action by the court to eventually push for 
a legislative solution.  In this case, the state court 
system was utilized as a catalyst of legislative reform 
through agenda setting and reframing.   
In the case of transportation infrastructure, 
reformers attempted to engage in quasi-judicial reform 
strategies as a way to break free of legislative gridlock, 
but, after carefully assessing the opportunity structures 
present, decided on an abstaining strategy.  This case 
shows that interdependent, multi-venue strategies are not 
always successful but are nevertheless evaluated by 
reformers in their pursuits.  Therefore, we must not 
confuse the lack of activity in one venue to be less 
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strategic in nature that the presence of activity in 
another.  Due to the perceived barriers to entry to the 
state court system and challenging political landscape, 
reformers are currently attempting to reach the Republican 
Party base in the hopes of changing the characterization of 
their issue in Texas.   
The highly politically salient issue of voter ID shows 
additional ways in which reformers utilize the judicial and 
quasi-judicial strategies hand in hand with legislative 
reform.  Despite an overwhelming legislative majority, 
those fighting against voter ID seized every legislative 
opportunity to lay the foundation for a court based 
strategy.  Thus, it is not simply a one-directional 
relationship between the courts and the legislative process 
(judicial-based strategies utilized to push or curtail 
legislative reform).  The legislative process also is 
utilized by reformers to directly impact a pre-defined 
court strategy – legislative process is used to drive court 
centered reform just as and judicial and judicial like 
strategies are used to push legislative agendas. 
The above discussed case studies vary from highly 
technical and mundane areas of state policy to highly 
public and polarizing.  Yet across all three case studies, 
evidence supports a multi-venue strategic lens utilized by 
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reformers.  Thus, we see the presence of a perceived 
interdependence of legislative and judicial venues by 
reformers across issue type in the state of Texas context.  
But how generalizable is this context that is defined by 
partisan judicial selection, brief legislative session on a 
biennial legislative cycle, and one-party domination across 
reform venues?  The theoretical framework that I have put 
forth builds upon well documented literature regarding 
social movements (opportunity structures) and courts and 
social policy making.  The transcendence of context in the 
argument that opportunity structures shape reform strategy 
is well documented.  Thus we would expect the notion that 
reformers across contexts assessing the institutional and 
political rules of the game to be generalizable, paying 
attention to the specific institutional design harnessing 
the availability of venues.  In the Texas case, I orient 
the discussion in light of the nuances of institutional 
design to make sense of the case studies, but I do not 
argue nor do the case studies show that the design itself 
drives reform.  Rather, reformers assess the opportunity 
structure based upon the design and political factors.  
This argument, therefore, is not overly constrained to the 
Texas context.      
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The argument underlying why a reformer would utilize a 
multi-venue approach to maximize the likelihood of success 
is also well documented within the public law literature 
i.e. that courts are not all that good at effecting 
standalone reform.  The particular institutional design 
characterized by this literature is overwhelmingly 
appointed judicial selection.  While the Texas case differs 
along these lines, it stands to reason that the logic 
supporting multi-venue reform is highly generalizable.  
This study did not draw comparisons in reform strategy in 
cases that varied according to judicial selection and that 
may well be an area of fruitful research.  My primary 
argument that reformers who are constrained by the overall 
opportunity structures available choose a set of strategies 
that utilize multiple venues in ways that strengthen each 
other, so that the strategies are not just alternative or 
sequential but interdependent, builds upon well 
established, broad-based scholarly literature that is 
readily generalizable across contexts.  The rich case study 
analysis that the examination of the Texas case provides 
allows us to uncover rich detail in reform strategy as it 
applies to broader arguments in the literature.   
It may be that with further scholarly investigation 
and testing, we are able to make broader generalizations as 
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to the strategic behavior of reformers. Potential large n 
studies may examine the strategy of policy change across 
states with varying levels of partisanship.  The in-depth 
case studies in this project reveal a multi-venue approach 
across issue areas, but perhaps the extent to which the 
legislature is divided may (or may not) impact the strategy 
of policy change with regard to both judicial and 
legislative venues.  Additional studies may also examine 
the extent to which reformers are professionalized.  
Correlation may exist as to the occurrence of multi-venue 
avenues of reform with highly professionalized groups.  
Much could also be gained from a comparative analysis of 
reform strategies in other democratic environments 
potentially teasing out a “strategic reform culture” that 
is either uniquely American or common in established 
democracies.  Furthermore, additional in-depth case studies 
at the state level will add to our body of knowledge with 
regard to the strategy of policy change from which 
additional hypotheses can be generated.       
The fact that the examined case studies support this 
intertwined relationship between judicial and legislative 
reform may at first blush seem common sensical and 
therefore less interesting in the scholarly community.  
However, the public law literature has primarily focused on 
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the role of courts in policy reform.  My contention is that 
the examination role of courts in policy reform, as 
demonstrated by this research, must be situated within the 
framework in which reformers truly operate.  Institutional 
frameworks may vary from case to case, but taking into 
account the framework as a whole is critical to 
understanding how judicial and quasi-judicial strategies 
are really utilized by reformers to advance their goals.  
If we isolate discussions of courts and policy reform to 
just the institution of federal courts, we may miss 
valuable insight as to how reformers actually think about 
institutions.  Imagine the voter ID case study previously 
examined with such a lens.  Hypothetically, the story in a 
few years might be explained by traditional counter-
majoritarian means that reformers utilized the Court in its 
role as a protector of minority rights; but without 1) 
contextualizing the Court within a federal framework and 2) 
examining the reform strategy in light of both the 
legislative and judicial process at the state level, we 
would miss out on the utilization of the legislative 
process by both sides to either advance or inhibit the 
United States Supreme Court from being able to act in the 
first place.  In the state arena, the explanation of the 
scope of practice battle between the engineers and 
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architects may support impact arguments, or lack thereof, 
that courts are not really good at policy reform in the 
first place because final resolution was not achieved 
through court ruling.  By viewing judicial reforms in the 
context of overall reform strategy where reformers utilize 
both the legislature and judicial system interdependently, 
we understand more clearly that reformers were utilizing 
the court to produce a specific legislative outcome.  
The significance of this research is that the 
legislative and judicial arenas of reform are not viewed by 
reformers as separate pathways but rather synergistic in 
nature.  Each case study demonstrates how reformers 
utilized both venues interdependently to achieve a desired 
goal.  By reorienting the lens by which we hypothesize, 
investigate, and study the use of courts, perhaps more 
nuances of the inter-workings of government systems will be 
revealed.  More research within the public law discipline 
regarding the use of judicial and quasi-judicial avenues 
reform in conjunction to legislative reform is needed to 
further our understanding of the relationship of role of 
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